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Gordon Sidney Harrington served as Premier of Nova Scotia from 1930 to 1933. 
However, this investigation ends with his election to the Nova Scotia Legislature in 1925 
and covers important but little known aspects of his career. From being mayor of Glace 
Bay, he raised, trained and led “B” Company of the 185
th
 Cape Breton Highlanders 
overseas in the First World War. He served at the Front, then became Deputy Minister 
Canadian Forces Overseas. He was instrumental in Canada’s gaining control of its forces, 
he negotiated the financial settlement with the British War Office and oversaw the 
repatriation of Canadians after the war. Back in Cape Breton he defended known 
communists. Taking on the British Empire Steel Corporation, which consistently abused 
its employees, led him into politics. Within his first year as Minister of Public Works and 
Mines he quelled years of tumult in the coal fields of Nova Scotia. 
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Allan MacDonald, a stalwart of the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) 
District 26 in the early 20
th
 century, engaged in what seems to have been an incongruous 
activity. Asked why he had been a Conservative Party organizer, Allan’s oldest daughter 
clarified that he was not a “Conservative” organizer. He was a “Harrington”  organizer. 
Who was Harrington?  
Her brief answer was that Gordon Sidney Harrington was the union lawyer who 
became Premier of Nova Scotia in 1930. Allan’s daughter was not alone in believing that 
Harrington was a friend of the miners. Certainly he was that, but the story of Harrington’s 
life, and of Harrington himself, is much more complicated and deserves attention both 
because of his dedication to the miners and the service he provided to Canada during his 
years overseas in the First World War. 
This study will explore what drove a man who could have lived a comfortable life 
and who derived peace and solace from the outdoors, to find himself continually in the 
midst of institutions redolent of intrigue, internal dissention and condemnation by outside 
forces, and how through all of it, he earned – the evidence suggests – increasing respect 
and trust. Although the respect and trust continued well into his service in the Nova 
Scotia Legislature, this investigation will end with his first year as an Member of the 
Legislative Assembly and provincial minister, and will cover the years he spent as mayor 
of Glace Bay, Deputy Minister of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada (OMFC) in 





Minister who broke the hold of the British Empire Steel Corporation (Besco) on the 
mining communities in UMW District 26. 
There are mysteries surrounding Harrington’s life that will not be resolved. 
Neither Harrington nor his wife left personal papers. Those few who have mentioned him 
in accounts of the labour upheavals in the mining communities in the early part of the 
twentieth century have done so largely in passing, offering little comment on his 
performance as legal counsel to the UMW both before and after the First World War. C. 
W. Wade, UMW author of the unpublished History of District 26, seemed to have gone 
the farthest when he wrote, referring to an incident at the Sydney Steel Plant in 1923, 




Harrington was born in Halifax on 7 August, 1883, the third child and oldest son 
of Charles Sidney Harrington and Mary Sophia Ratchford DeWolf. C. Sidney, as he was 
known, was a prominent Halifax lawyer, a partner of future Prime Minister Robert 
Borden, and an unsuccessful Conservative candidate for the provincial legislature. The 
family had considerable wealth, although after C. Sidney Harrington’s death in 1903 its 
circumstances appear to have been reduced, and Gordon Harrington had to borrow to 
make his way through law school. For reasons that are difficult to gauge, Harrington 
chose soon after graduation to abandon legal practice in Halifax in favour of Glace Bay. 
He then commenced his long legal relationship with the UMW. 
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In the meantime, he and Katherine MacDonald were married in the Rectory of the 
Anglican Church in Sydney on 31 October 1910. Soon thereafter he became mayor of 
Glace Bay, but after the outbreak of the First World War he went on overseas service 
with the 185
th
 Cape Breton Highlanders, moving on as the war continued to become 
Deputy Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada (OMFC) and so to have 
demanding administrative responsibilities. Following the Armistice, he continued in this 
position for a time, but eventually returned to Cape Breton professing a desire for a 
peaceful and low-key life as he recovered from serious war-related health issues. Instead, 
his quickly-resumed role with the UMW put him in the midst of the tempestuous capital-
labour disputes that characterized industrial Cape Breton during the first half of the 
1920s. By 1925, no doubt motivated by the desperate conditions created by the bitter 
strike and lockout of that year, Harrington was ready to run for provincial elected office. 
His election in Cape Breton Centre led to his appointment as Minister of Labour under 
Premier E.N. Rhodes, and subsequently to his succeeding Rhodes as Premier.  
Immediately after the 1925 election, with Rhodes, Harrington negotiated a 
temporary settlement that got the miners back to work, and he initiated the Royal 
Commission of Sir Andrew Rae Duncan that enquired into the working and living 
conditions of the miners. While a further study would be required in order to do justice to 
Harrington’s later career, it is the contention of this thesis that the key to understanding 
his entry into provincial political life lies in examining his earlier experiences. Even 
though working with the limited source base that results from the loss or destruction of 





that, during Harrington’s younger years leading up to his early 40s, made him an 
important entrant into Nova Scotia’s public life. 
Although both the Harringtons and DeWolfs were prominent Halifax families in 
the late nineteenth century in Halifax, few records remain in existence. Information on 
Harrington’s early life was gleaned from records at Nova Scotia Archives and Records 
Management (NSA), at the Prothonotary’s office of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, 
from McAlpine’s Business Directory and from later interviews. His activities as legal 
counsel to the UMW before the First World War were recorded in his obituaries and in a 
few newspaper articles found by chance. Several publications dealing with the early years 
of mining in Cape Breton provided context for the period.
2
 
Few records survive of Harrington’s time as mayor of Glace Bay but his time 
spent in raising and training “B” Company of the 185
th
 Cape Breton Highlanders was 
found in newspaper reports and in Rev. Clarence MacKinnon’s papers at the Maritime 
Conference of the United Church of Canada. M. Stuart Hunt’s Nova Scotia’s Part in the 
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Great War was an introduction to Harrington’s war years.3 It led to Desmond Morton’s A 
Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada's Overseas Ministry in the First World War.4 This 
book was instrumental in instigating an investigation at Library and Archives Canada into 
the papers of Harrington’s colleagues and superiors during and after the war which 
included important communications with and about Harrington that provided more 
context for that period, as did Tim Cook’s The Madman and the Butcher.5 
Nineteen hundred and twenty to 1925 was a time of continuing crises in the coal 
industry in Nova Scotia and particularly in Cape Breton. Many of the publications 
mentioned above also covered this period. Frank, for instance also wrote about the British 
Empire Steel Corporation and J.B. McLachlan’s trial for seditious libel.
6
 The transcripts 
for that trial from LAC, as well as files at NSA, are incomplete but useful nevertheless. 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s papers added to Don McGillivray’s publications about 
military intervention in the coalfields.
7
 Newspapers reports were a significant source of 
information about Harrington’s support for the miners in 1922, the year the Royal 
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Commission Respecting the Coal Mining Industry in Nova Scotia (The Duncan 
Commission of 1925) claimed was the lowest ebb in labour-management relations.
8
 Brian 
Tennyson advised me about a letter he found in London and which he deposited at the 
Beaton Institute in which Harrington requested advice concerning the establishment of a 
Royal Commission from the British Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Institute also 
retains some copies of the company’s newspaper, the Besco Bulletin and NSA’s Rhodes 
Papers shed light on Harrington’s focus on the mining part of his portfolio of Public 
Works and Mines. 
After he had won elections in 1925 and 1928, Premier Harrington told a reporter 
in 1931 that there were still those who believed he was a died-in-the-wool Conservative 
who used the miners for political purposes.
9
 Given the distrust that had evolved in that 
community, the astute miners would have seen through such a charade and would not 
have re-elected him, which they would do again in 1933. There can be no doubt that in 
Harrington’s own mind, he was doing what he felt to be his duty and fulfilling his need to 
be useful.
10
 Harrington’s willingness to risk his health in order to be useful is one the 
mysteries that remains unanswered at the close of this investigation. What is known is 
that the before Harrington became Minister of Public Works and Mines, the miners had a 
history of bitter experience with governments’ support for mine operators. Harrington 
was able to bring much-needed peace to the coalfields of Nova Scotia.  
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Inspiring Trust and Confidence 
Gordon Sidney Harrington (1883-1943), lawyer, Deputy Minister of Canadian 
Forces Overseas in the First World War, and Premier of Nova Scotia from 1930 to 1933, 
was born into a comfortable life in upper-class Halifax. His paternal grandfather, Edward 
Henry Harrington, a lawyer who had been Sheriff of Antigonish and Guysboro counties, 
settled in Halifax where he and his wife, Louisa Pinnell raised nine children on an estate 
named “Hawthorn” near the corner of Gottingen and North Streets.
11
 Gordon’s father, 
Charles Sidney Harrington, known as C. Sidney, was the youngest living Harrington 
child and a lawyer. He married Mary Sophia Ratchford DeWolf in 1875. It appears they 
were living on the Harrington property with their two daughters, Helen (Maud), and 
Agnes (Mollie) when their first son, Gordon was born on 7 August 1883. 
 Mary Sophia DeWolf was known to the family as Mae.
12
 She was the daughter of 
Dr. James DeWolf, a graduate of Edinburgh University where he studied medicine and 
shared classes with a future Prime Minister, Charles Tupper. Dr. DeWolf’s father, known 
as T.A.S. DeWolf, was a wealthy merchant who, with his son Charles, operated 
businesses in Halifax and in Horton in the Annapolis Valley. Dr. James DeWolf was 
president of the Nova Scotia Philanthropic Society and one of the founders of the 
Medical Society of Nova Scotia in 1854. He specialized in nervous disorders and in 1857 
became superintendent of the Nova Scotia Hospital, then popularly known as Mount 
Hope. DeWolf brought enlightened treatment to the mentally ill but conflicts with the 
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Board and subordinates led to his dismissal in1878, after which he moved to Halifax 
where he lived on his investments.
13
 
Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden claimed that he and C. Sidney Harrington 
together established the Canadian Bar Association, and C. Sidney was that organization’s 
first vice president.
14
 As a Liberal-Conservative, C. Sidney Harrington unsuccessfully 
contested the provincial constituency of Annapolis against the Attorney-General J.W. 
Longley in 1886. Although Harrington lost the election, Borden claimed C. Sidney was 
an excellent after-dinner speaker and equally effective on the hustings.
15
 
C. Sidney and his colleagues, many of them relatives, formed the Game and 
Inland Fishery Protection Society that advised the provincial government on policies to 
protect wildlife.
16
 In 1875, C. Sidney Harrington was the first Chief Commissioner of the 
Game and Inland Fisheries Protection Act. It was the responsibility of the Game Society 
to administer and enforce wildlife statutes. The society sold hunting and fishing licenses 
and monitored wildlife populations from its own observations and those of others. The 
province provided the society with a grant to offset its costs in game protection during 
much of the period from its inception in 1852.
17
 C. Sidney’s obituary included the 
information that along with being “one of the foremost members of the Bar of Nova 
Scotia and president of the Nova Scotia Bar Association” much, if not all game 
protection legislation was drafted by Harrington and “enacted as a result of his 
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 C. Sidney’s oldest son, Gordon, shared his family’s love of the outdoors, 
hunting and fishing, a hobby that served him well throughout his life. 
Gordon’s maternal grandmother died in 1899. She left Gordon’s sisters $500.00 
each and $250 to each of the three grandsons: Gordon, James, and Hugh. Dr. DeWolf 
died two years later and left identical bequests to the grandchildren. To his daughter, 
Mary, he left an interest in his house on Morris Street and all its furnishing.
19
 Not listed 
in his will, but found in Mary’s when she died in 1924, was a twice-yearly income of 
$260 from her father’s estate.
20
 C. Sidney suffered from Bright’s Disease and paralysis. 
He died of a heart attack on 5 September 1903, leaving no will.
21
 Gordon, then 20, 
petitioned the court to release his father’s assets to his mother.
22
 It appears the 
Harringtons collected rent from the various properties they acquired during their marriage 
but that there were few other assets. The houses were located in Dartmouth, on Gottingen 
Street in Halifax, and in Bedford. The family apparently owned the unit in which they 
lived in a row of townhouses on Halifax’s South Park Street. Along with the property she 




  Thus, Gordon Harrington came from a family background of apparent affluence 
and strong political connections, but outside of the modest bequest from his grandparents, 
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in reality he enjoyed very little inherited wealth. Indeed he had to go into debt to pay his 
way through law school when his father died.
24
 
 Harrington attended Dalhousie Law School at a time when its founder, Richard 
Chapman Weldon, insisted on a focus on international and constitutional law. Of the 
curriculum, Weldon wrote, “We may fairly hope that some of our students will, in their 
riper years be called upon to discharge public duties. We aim to help these to act with 
fidelity and wisdom.”
25
 No doubt this focus informed future events in Gordon 
Harrington’s life and likely underpinned his concept of duty. Many classes were taught 
by “downtowners,” men who combined practicing law and teaching at the Law School.  
Both P.B. Waite and John Willis wrote that many of them were not dependable but Willis 




Following graduation from Dalhousie Law School in 1904, Harrington was 
employed for a short time in the law firm of Borden, Ritchie and Chisholm and given 
family contacts he might have lived a comfortable life in Halifax society. He told 
Beverley Owen that during his undergraduate years, he developed “an insatiable taste for 
economic and sociological literature.” He moved to Glace Bay where he “could apply his 
academic knowledge to industrial and labour conditions as then prevailed in Cape 
                                                   
24
 LAC, MG26-H, Robert Borden Papers, Harrington to Borden, 15 August 1930. 
25
 P.B. Waite, The Lives of Dalhousie University, Volume I, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1994), 140.     
26







 In Glace Bay, Harrington set up a practice with his classmate, John MacKinley 
Cameron. 
Because of labour troubles that, on occasion, attracted national attention, a 
perception has developed of early Glace Bay as a town of unremitting poverty and 
desolation, with all miners’ families in deplorable housing and forever tied to the 
company stores. Certainly these conditions did exist in particular areas of the town, yet 
prior to the amalgamation of local mines under the Dominion Coal Company in 1893, it 
appears the town had a thriving port with a customs house.
28
 Dozens of businesses stood 
on two main roads that converged at the harbor.
29
 
At the turn of the 20
th
 century, the Nova Scotia government gave the Dominion 
Coal Company a 99-year lease on all the coalfields south of Sydney Harbour. In return 
the company paid a 12.5 cent royalty on each ton of coal raised. The coal company 
absorbed the existing mines, closing some and opening others. It opened a steel plant in 
Sydney that would utilize much of the coal production.
30
 
In 1901 the coal company built several hundred small, tightly-packed, double 
company houses in the New Aberdeen and Caledonia areas of Glace Bay, and more in 
neighbouring No. 6, New Waterford and Birch Grove to absorb the thousands of families 
responding to advertisements for miners placed in Canada, the United States and Europe. 
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Gordon Harrington’s home and his office are listed in McAlpine’s Directory for 
1907.
32
 Reflecting the population explosion in the town, the Directory, while incomplete, 
lists businesses selling goods and services to the townspeople as well as to those who 
came by train and tram car from surrounding communities to shop and for entertainment. 
Stores sold everything from ice cream to wagons, fresh fruit to furs. McArel’s three-
storey department store on Commercial Street carried everything from groceries to 
harnesses. The town also boasted several banks, insurance companies, hotels, movie 
houses and live theatre venues. There was one indoor skating rink and several outdoor 
ones, ball fields and swimming clubs. Women as well as men had hockey, basketball and 
swim teams. There was a modern hospital, schools, and several churches. The Directory 
listed both businesses and individuals. Not all miners who owned their own homes were 
listed, but it appears the Directory does not include those renting company houses. 
Religion played a major role in Glace Bay, as in other nearby mining 
communities. Three churches in Glace Bay served the largely Roman Catholic 
population. A massive Presbyterian church in the centre of town loomed over 
neighbouring places of worship catering to the Anglicans, Baptists, Greek Orthodox and 
Methodists. The first synagogue in Eastern Canada was built in Glace Bay.  Smaller 
Catholic and Protestant churches were built in New Aberdeen and Caledonia, near the 
newer company houses. 
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There were Irish and Acadian Catholics, along with Scottish Presbyterians and 
smaller ethnic groups, but Scottish Catholic traditions dominated the mining 
communities. Gaelic was heard on the street and in the mines’ washhouses. Churches 
held Gaelic services.
33




In setting up a practice in Glace Bay, Gordon Harrington, an Anglican from 
Halifax, stepped into what must have been for him an entirely new culture, complete with 
new languages. His law partner, Cameron, was from Pictou and of Scottish origin. He 
may have explained to Harrington how to navigate the Scottish culture.
35
 David Frank 
wrote that in 1907, almost 80 per cent of the men working for the Dominion Coal 
Company were under 30 years of age and descended from parents who had come from 




Political and economic disruptions in Scotland in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century led to tens of thousands of Scots leaving the country, either voluntarily or 
through the infamous Highland Clearances. It has been estimated that between 1790 and 
1830 some 50,000 arrived on the shores of Cape Breton Island. The largest influx 
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occurred between 1800 and 1815. Those who arrived later found themselves on 
backlands that were almost impossible to farm. Between 1845 and 1851 potato rot caused 
near-starvation on the Island. Concurrently, wheat fly destroyed the meagre wheat crop.
37
 
In Cape Breton, the bulk of the Scottish migration to rural Cape Breton was made up of 
“unpropertied immigrant crofters from the Highlands, [who] became the main source of 
the urban proletariat that emerged in the coal towns from mid-century onward.”
38
 
Harrington married Katherine Agnes MacDonald in the rectory of the Anglican 
Church in Sydney in 1910. She was 19, he 27. Katherine was one of seven children of 
coal miner Michael MacDonald and his wife Jessie, who lived in Reserve Mines, near 
Glace Bay. Katherine’s father was the son of a Scottish immigrant, and had been one of 
three brothers who left Boisdale in rural Cape Breton for the mining communities in the 
mid-nineteenth century.
39
 Katherine’s father worked in a mine at Reserve Mines. His 
brother, Rory, went first to mine coal in Port Morien and then Glace Bay. The third 
brother, James, was a seafarer who lived in Dominion and had a large family. James’s 
son, Michael, was a CCF member of the legislature from 1945 to 1953 and leader of the 
CCF/NDP party from 1953 to 1963.
40
 Another son, Alex, became president of District 
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Katherine’s parents owned their own home on Main Street in Reserve Mines, 
which Katherine’s niece remembered as a large comfortable house with several musical 
instruments.
42
 The family was Catholic, and politically Liberal. In marrying outside the 
Catholic Church, Katherine risked the ire of family and community.
43
 Regardless of the 
opinion of the community, there is no indication that deserting her religion or political 
leanings affected her relationship with her own immediate family.
44
 Neither was there a 
problem with the Harringtons. In Halifax, Harry Piers, Harrington’s first cousin, recorded 
that his mother gave Gordon’s wife a silver spoon for a wedding present, and on 30 
December 1910, Gordon and Katherine were in Halifax visiting Gordon’s mother at 




Harrington chose well in finding a location from which to study sociology and 
labour. The 1888 Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital held 
hearings in Glace Bay where members interviewed two miners, one of whom was a coal 
cutter who rarely took home any money after charges were deducted.
46
 Charges included 
house rental, charges for miners’ materials, purchases  at the company store, and charges 
for the doctor and the school. At that time, the churches had not started collecting from 
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the check-off and it would be another ten to twelve years before payments for the hospital 
would be deducted. The second miner, who owned his own home, also owned a woodlot. 
He said he could not sell wood to the Caledonia mine because he did not owe enough at 
the company store, then owned by the mine manager, David MacKeen.
47
 
Once caught in the trap of company housing and company stores, it is easy to see 
how it was important to have young boys go into the mines to help the usually-large 
families. They were paid less than adults but had the same deductions taken from their 
pay. By the turn of the century, half the miners in Nova Scotia were under twenty years 
of age and three quarters of them were under thirty.
48
 When boys had been working since 
they were eight or ten, it was natural that by eighteen they felt adult enough to marry and 
begin their own families, starting the process over again. Often these early marriages 
combined with too little pay, too much debt and irregular work, led to systemic poverty.  
In a book of mining photos honouring legendary Glace Bay photographer, Leslie 
Shedden, Don MacGillivray wrote about the difficulty Highland Scots had in bending to 
authority, the reverence of many miners for “Saint Monday,” as well as the need for other 




The hardships in mining communities in 1888, though severe, had been relatively 
improved from earlier years due to the efforts of the Provincial Workmen’s Association 
(PWA). The PWA was founded in Springhill in 1879 by the usually independent miners 
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who banded together to have wage cuts restored. Their success led them to expand the 
organization. The PWA moved into Cape Breton in 1881 and made impressive progress 
in the miners’ working conditions.
 50
 According to an anonymous essay at the Glace Bay 
Miners’ Museum web site:  
The essential points of the PWA were unity, equity and progress. It 
wanted to make the mining population a respected segment of the 
community. The PWA used three notable tactics to accomplish its aims: 





The PWA was a fairly loose confederation of skilled colliers’ lodges under the 
leadership of General Secretary Robert Drummond, described by labour historian Craig 
Heron as follows:  
An earnest, preachy teetotaler obsessed with working class respectability, 
Drummond was always ready to trumpet the rights of independent workers 
in the face of unreasonably autocratic mine managers and an undemocratic 
state.  With or without his blessing, local PWA lodges waged surprisingly 
successful battles to retain their direct control over coal-hewing 
operations. 
 
 While absenteeism was accepted by the mine operators, writers such as 
MacGillivray, James Morrison, McKay and Heron suggest that there were reasons to 
believe that the miners saw themselves as partners in coal production and worked 
overtime when they considered it necessary to “get the coal out.”
52
 
At the turn of the twentieth century things changed rapidly with the amalgamation 
of the coal mines, and the influx of a new labour force, mostly from Britain, composed of 
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workers who brought with them an antagonism towards capitalism.  None was more 
strident in that antagonism than J.B. McLachlan. Heron wrote: 
[Coal miners’] proud independence and solidarity in the workplace made 
the miners particularly resistant to the new managerial style of monopoly 
capitalism and were strengthened by the immigration of militant young 




McLachlan had been blacklisted for his union activities in his native Lanarkshire 
in Scotland and soon after he, his wife, and their four children arrived in North Sydney 
where he was also blacklisted by the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company. The 
McLachlan family then moved to Glace Bay.
54
 There, McLachlan gathered many 
followers who complained that the PWA was a company-controlled union. In 1904, the 
PWA lost a strike at the Sydney Steel Plant, giving more incentive to critics. Many 
thereupon applied for membership of the rival United Mine Workers of America (UMW), 
and McLachlan assumed the job of secretary-treasurer, a salaried position to which he 
would continually be re-elected. He and his family, which would grow to nine children, 
lived on a small farm at Steele’s Hill on the outskirts of town.
55
 
No record has been found to indicate exactly when District 26 of the UMW 
retained Gordon Harrington as its legal counsel but that event would lead to a decades-
long interaction between McLachlan and Harrington. District 26 applied to the Dominion 
Coal Company to replace the PWA as representatives of the coal miners. The PWA, 
confident of its support, agreed to a referendum. It was held on 24 June 1909, but with 
fewer than half the miners voting and the UMW winning by some 400 votes, the PWA 
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refused to concede and retained the support of the company. Membership in the UMW 
increased steadily, even though members suffered by getting assigned the worst 
equipment and the worst shifts.
56
 Jack Williams wrote that the PWA had negotiated a 
closed-shop agreement with the coal company, which included the check-off for union 
dues. Men who left the PWA were subject to dismissal.
57
 Tensions rose between 1908 
and 1909. On April 24, 1909, the PWA Grand Secretary John Moffatt told the Sydney 
Post that the PWA would not be worried if the UMW members were to go on strike. He 
said there were thirteen PWA lodges in and around Glace Bay with an average of 400 
members each who could keep the mines working. At the same time, in the same paper, a 
representative of the UMW made the unlikely claim that the union had no intention of 
going on strike and the $20,000 sent to District 26 from UMW international headquarters 
was only for education.
58
 
In preparation for a strike, the UMW was required under the Industrial Disputes 
Investigation Act to apply for conciliation board. It did so and the conciliation board 
favoured the company and the PWA. On 5 July 1909, the Dominion Coal Company 
posted a notice that it would not recognize the UMW and that in the event of a strike it 
would continue to operate with the aid of loyal men. On 6 July 1909, 2500 members of 
the UMW went on strike.
59
 
In many ways, the 1909 strike demonstrated how Glace Bay had changed from 
the beginning of the century. Coal royalties were now one of the largest sources of 
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income for the provincial government,
60
 and it therefore had a stake in seeing that the 
mines continued operating.  
Events surrounding the 1909 strike created a mythology within the mining 
communities, particularly areas of Glace Bay which developed a rigid anti-capitalist 
attitude that lasted for generations. The company asked the mayor and council of Glace 
Bay to request troops to protect its property, in accordance with the Militia Act, under 
which mayors or magistrates could apply to the Minister of Militia for troops to preserve 
public order and protect property.  
The mayor, John C. Douglas, a prominent Conservative and one of the lawyers 
for the UMW, refused. The company then went to a county judge, who signed the order. 
The arrival of troops in 1909 represented, to the UMW membership, unqualified 
government support for the coal company. The troops set up defences around the pit 
heads, the strongest of which were installed at the militant No.2 colliery at New 
Aberdeen. Stories abound about UMW members and their families taunting PWA 
members who had to be escorted to work amid stone-throwing and yells of “scabs.” PWA 
members were harassed on the street and at their homes. They laid charges against the 
agitators, many of whom were arrested. The UMW provided bail for the accused and its 
lawyers, including Harrington, laid harassment charges against the people who 
complained of harassment.
61
 The general manager, G.H. Duggan, was charged with 
attacking a protester. A reporter of the Sydney Post claimed that Harrington’s cross-
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examination of Duggan was too tame for the judge to take seriously, wanting instead 
proof of “sticks, fisticuffs or bad language.”
62
 
Not only did the 1909 strike cause permanent labour-management distrust, but it 
also caused divisions within the community, and within families. 
Three weeks into the strike, the company began evicting striking miners from 
company houses. Father James Fraser of Saint John’s Catholic Church in New Aberdeen 
opened the church basement to miners’ families. One story claims that Father Fraser was 
immediately taken from the parish for his efforts.
63
 In fact, while the priest tried 
unsuccessfully to use his personal acquaintance with Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier to 
get help for the miners, he continued at Saint John’s parish until 1916.
64
 
The communities of Bridgeport and Dominion lie approximately two miles west 
of New Aberdeen. They were older, settled, mostly Catholic and mostly PWA supporters. 
On 30 June 1909, UMW members gathered in Glace Bay and formed a parade, led by 
UMW president, Dan McDougall, to march to Dominion. In Glace Bay, Mayor Douglas 
refused to halt the march despite the fact that on the town council were two members of 
the PWA and two other mine contractors who were likely PWA supporters given the coal 
company’s closed shop.
65
 The Town of Dominion passed an emergency bylaw on Friday 
29 July forbidding every kind of parade, meeting or street loitering within the town 
without a permit. It may be an overstatement to suggest that the UMW marchers parading 
into Dominion was akin to Orangemen in Belfast marching into Falls Road, but 
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McDougall was what David Frank described as a prominent Orangeman, and he was 
riding a white horse.
66
 Undoubtedly, the marchers were aware of the bylaw passed a day 
earlier. As they crossed the bridge at Cadegan’s Brook, the border between Bridgeport 
and Dominion, they saw a machine gun nest set up on the steps of Immaculate 
Conception Church with the gun aimed at the marchers. They turned around and marched 
back to Glace Bay. 
67
 
The strike eventually failed. Many on the international executive of the UMW 
argued that if the strike was not over when the shipping season closed, it should be shut 
down. However, at McLachlan’s urging, it dragged on into the winter, costing the head 
office of the UMW some $800,000 for food, health care and lodging of striking miners 
and their families.
68
 Jack Williams places the amount at $1,000,000.
69
 Whichever the real 
cost, it was enough to encourage the international union to balk at funding future strikes. 
Troops continued to patrol the district. Men began drifting back to work and were 
compelled to join the PWA and take part in the check-off. In April of 1910 the strike was 
officially over in Cape Breton, although it dragged out for another year in Springhill. In 
1913, the UMW District 26, having too few members, lost its charter.
70
 
Although the strike caused ongoing dissention between supporters of the UMW 
and supporters of the PWA, Gordon Harrington, who had been legal counsel for UMW, 
the union that lost the battle, was elected mayor in March of 1913. The election followed 
the death of Mayor Henry MacDonald. MacDonald, who died on 3December 1912 of 
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Bright’s Disease, had been a very popular figure. A coal miner before becoming a 
businessman and stipendiary magistrate, MacDonald, a Roman Catholic, commanded 
support across political and religious lines.
71
 Harrington’s election led the Sydney Post, a 
Conservative newspaper, to report that the new mayor had won the largest majority in the 
history of the town, proving that although born in Halifax, he had evidently established 
himself firmly in the confidence of the citizens.
72
 The Liberal Sydney Record wrote that 
there was a small turn-out of 1000 of the 3700 eligible voters. With questionable 
mathematics, it went on to report that Harrington won 1339 votes to 537 for his 
opponent. Without congratulating the winner, the Record noted that the defeat of Acting 
Mayor P.E. Ogilvie, who had been on council since the town’s incorporation, would be a 
great loss to his many friends.
73
 
The minutes of Glace Bay council meetings for those years appear to have been 
lost, most likely to a fire in the town hall, although some reports have survived.
74
 The 
problems that faced the town in 1913 would continue to exist for years to come, 
particularly financial difficulties and health problems resulting from poor sanitation and 
poor nutrition, which in turn resulted in poor educational prospects for many of the 
town’s children. The reports from various commissions, including the 1925 Royal 
Commission enquiring into the coal mining industry in Nova Scotia, indicate a situation 
in Glace Bay whereby the tracts of company housing were not properly maintained. 
Some areas had open sewers, and no water supply. Although these problems existed 
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mostly in the areas of company housing, the effects of poor sanitation permeated the 
town through illness, truancy, and poor prospects for the children from those areas.
75
 
In 1914, causes of death were listed for the first time in Glace Bay’s annual health 
reports. Dr. MacLean, the town’s Medical Officer of Health, wrote that money the town 
spent on sewers, water supply and the hospital went a long way in preventing typhoid 
fever but further improvement could be made by more improvements to sanitation and 
more monitoring of the sources of the town’s milk supply. The major cause of children’s 
deaths was cholera infantum, a persistent problem in the town because of unsanitary 
surroundings mostly in the areas of company houses.
76
 
Many years later, at the time of Harrington’s death, Glace Bay mayor D. W. 
Morrison noted that the UMW had hired Harrington as its legal counsel during the 1909 
strike and that following this experience he became interested in civic politics. Morrison 
said he had been fortunate to be on council when Harrington was mayor and that the town 
made much progress during that time.
77
 
In 1915, Harrington resigned as mayor to join the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
to fight with Britain in the First World War. Harrington had been a militia officer with 
the Princess Patricia Fusiliers since 1899 and held the rank of captain.
78
 In December 
1914, four months after the outbreak of the war, Sir Samuel Hughes, Minister of Militia, 
spoke in Sydney as part of his effort to travel the country encouraging leaders in 
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communities to raise battalions which he promised would fight together overseas.
79
 Soon 
afterward, according to a local newspaper, “Major” Harrington – a rank he had not yet 
formally attained – was reported to have departed ceremoniously from Sydney for 
Halifax at the head of a party that was “over one hundred strong.”
80
 
 The group first set up on the Halifax Commons then moved to Aldershot as part 
of the fledgling 185
th 
Battalion, under the command Frank Parker Day. Day, born in 
Shubenacadie, Nova Scotia, and educated in England and Germany, had moved to the 
United States where he taught at university, but returned to Canada at the outbreak of 
World War I to enlist in the Canadian Forces. He served first with the 85th Canadian 
Infantry Battalion and later helped recruit and then commanded the 185th Cape Breton 
Highlanders.
81
 Harrington was second-in-command. The Heather, a newspaper for and 
about the 185
th
 Highlanders, reported: 
The concert given Major Harrington at King’s Theatre [unreadable] 28
th 
emphasized the truth of the saying, “Full many a flower’s born to blush, 
etc.”…….However, some real live ones appeared, some fine piano playing 
mouth –organ playing and dancing were handed out to the unsuspecting 







“Best recruiting center in the Empire,” read the headline in the Sydney Post: 
 
Cape Breton, the tight little island gave over twelve hundred men to the 
185
th
 battalion in three weeks and was the best recruiting centre in the 
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Day congratulated the women of Cape Breton and the people who opened their 
houses to recruiters as they travelled throughout the Island. On one Sunday battalion 
officers occupied four pulpits in Sydney. On the Monday and Tuesday North Sydney 
gave up more than 100 recruits.
84
 
 Harrington’s 1200 men from Glace Bay, New Waterford and surrounding area 
formed the 185
th 
“B” Company that began initial training at Broughton, an abandoned 
coal town 30 miles from Sydney.  
D.H. MacDougall, Vice President of Dosco and a native of Glace Bay, was made 
Honorary Colonel of the regiment. He made several gifts to the 185
th
 including large 
sums of money and outfitted a pipe band with pipes and drums.
 85
 Similar gifts were 
presented to each company, including one by Col. Thomas Cantley, President of Nova 




When the men arrived at Broughton the snow was too deep for training, clothing 
was inadequate and many of the men became ill. The Broughton Arms Hotel, considered 
the most up-to-date east of Montreal, was turned into a hospital. The Royal Engineers, 
who came to repair the plumbing, accidentally set the building on fire and it was totally 





 Cape Breton Highlanders, after nearly two months spent at 
Broughton for its mobilization center, left yesterday for the brigade camp 
at Kentville. 
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Leaving Broughton about 4 p.m. the train, which was divided into two 
sections with a half hour interval between them arrived at Sydney at 5:30 
p.m. 
The station platform and approaches were packed with dense throngs of 
people as the train steamed to and as the men began to detrain there was a 
roaring [cheers] from the crowds. The battalion formed up immediately by 
companies and headed by the splendid regimental band, each company 
being headed by pipers proceeded to Victoria Park. The ease and 
steadiness with which the men marched was particularly noticeable and 




Rev. Clarence MacKinnon, Principal of the Presbyterian College in Halifax and 
chaplain to the 219
th
, wrote that each battalion was distinguished by the colours of the 
feathers in their balmorals.
89
 
Harrington could not have anticipated any of these events when he first left the 
tree-lined streets of south end Halifax for Glace Bay. No doubt in 1905, the town would 
have offered a challenge, both physically and culturally, and certainly was a good 
location to practice law and study sociology and labour. That he fitted easily into the 
town and that his leadership skills soon emerged was demonstrated by his becoming 
mayor less than a decade later. It is worth repeating that he was legal counsel to the union 
that lost a long and bitter strike, yet was elected mayor of the town at the age of 30 and 
was headed for re-election, according to D.W. Morrison. There seems to be no question 
of his ability to gain the trust of the men he trained in the 185
th
 “B” company, and that 
trust would reappear in the labour struggles after the war. 
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The War Years 
1915 to 1920 
Col. Gordon S. Harrington’s Certificate of Service in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force states that he was appointed to a commissioned rank with the 85
th
 Battalion on 1 
October 1915 then transferred to the 185
th  
on 23 February 1916.
90
 
The SS Olympic, carrying all four Nova Scotia Highland Brigades, set sail from 
Halifax on 13 October 1916 for a five-day journey through the submarine-infested North 
Atlantic, arriving in Liverpool on 19 October. Both Katherine Harrington and Mabel 
Killam Day, wife of Frank Parker Day, would follow in November. The Olympic was the 
sister ship of the RMS Titanic and while some of the first class section had been 
designated for hospital space, the state rooms set aside for officers must have made them 
question “whether they were still in the land of the living or whether their merits might 
not have secured for them ‘quick translation to Elysian joys.’”
91
 The enlisted men slept 
under the decks in hammocks slung from the ceiling. Everyone had to wear a life belt 
throughout the voyage except at night.  
Gordon Sidney Harrington served with the 185
th





 Reserve Battalion, the Nova Scotia Regimental Depot, and the General List before 
being assigned to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in April, 1917. He 
was struck off strength on 5 January 1921 by reason of general demobilization.  
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From 1914 to 1918, the head office of Canada’s overseas mission was “chaotic 
and politics ridden.”
92
 Canadian Minister of the Militia General Samuel Hughes’s 
representative in England, Major General John Carson – appointed, like his associated 
appointee Max Aitken, later Lord Beaverbrook, by Hughes without Prime Minister 
Borden’s knowledge
93
 – assumed greater and greater power. The British War Office was 
confused as to who had what authority. Most officers in the Department knew that their 
careers were at the mercy of Hughes and tolerated his policies. Hughes created an 
Overseas Militia Council which was subordinate to the Militia Council in Ottawa but he 
kept it ineffective ensure his power was paramount in all matters.
94
 
Prime Minister Borden continually received letters from the field complaining of 
incompetence in the London office, insufficient equipment and supplies in the field, with 
serious implications for morale. There were allegations of serious corruption in the pay 
office and rumours of 214 surplus officers paid a total of $1064 per day to do nothing.
95
 
The Prime Minister was well aware of Hughes’s activities and reputation but for political 
reasons tried to work around this temperamental but still-popular minister. As scandals 
proliferated, Borden made unsuccessful attempts to rein in his minister. Increasingly, the 
incompetence of the Canadian military administration under Hughes was becoming 
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obvious, as the unnecessary loss of almost 1400 men at St. Eloi in April 1916 painfully 
indicated.
96
  According to Robert Craig Brown:  
By 1916, Hughes was a growing political liability for the government. He 
was detested in Quebec for his anti-French, anti-Catholic views, and 
distrusted by Cabinet colleagues for his financial and administrative 
shortcomings. His attempts to establish and control a Canadian military 
command structure overseas had resulted in chaos, leading in the fall to 
the creation by the prime minister of an overseas ministry answering 
directly to Cabinet.97 
 
The Canadian High Commissioner to Great Britain, Sir George Perley, proposed 
to Borden the establishment of a much smaller, more efficient council. Perley 
recommended that “such a council must be firmly based on an order-in-council with 
authority to manage our military affairs across the seas in a businesslike way.”
98
 By 18 
October 1916, Borden had a new plan that would permit a cabinet minister to live in 
London and have responsibility for personnel, property, and expenditures of the Canadian 
forces in Britain and on the continent. On all matters affecting the overseas forces, the 
minister would be responsible for negotiations with the British government. He could 
hire staff and recruit an advisory council. The minister would report to the cabinet 
through the Prime Minister and would receive no pay.
99
 Hughes raised objection after 
objection but, on 27 October 1916, an order-in-council established the new, civilian-run 
Overseas Military Forces of Canada (OMFC). The same day, another order-in-council 
made Sir George Perley minister of that organization.
100
 Not quite a month later, Hughes 
                                                   
96
 Canadian War Museum, http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/exhibitions/guerre/st-eloi-e.aspx, (accessed 21 
October 2013). 
97
 Brown, “Hughes, Sir Samuel,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography. 
98
 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 84. 
99
 Ibid, 85-86. 
100









In the meantime, on 19 October 1916 the Nova Scotia brigade, including the 185
th
 
Cape Breton Highlanders, disembarked at Liverpool. Their immediate experience of 
adverse weather and health issues including influenza was aggravated by the woeful 
inadequacy of their clothing and equipment. Moreover, the battalions were soon broken 
up to supply the huge losses in the British forces. On 30 November orders for the first 
draft of 800 men for France arrived,
102
 confirming the rumors and the fears that promises 
made to keep the battalions together would be ignored.  
Following further officer training in Bedford, England at the Imperial First Senior 
Infantry School where, according to a later report, Harrington passed the qualifying 
examination with the highest marks ever attained “at that institution during those times,” 
he assumed command of the 17
th
 Reserve battalion at Bramshott. The battalion had a full 
complement of 800. As a reserve battalion in the 5
th





 and to be distinctly Nova Scotian. It subsumed the 219
th





 From Bramshott, Harrington was transferred to London on 18 April 1917.
104
 
When requested by Borden to take on the OMFC, Perley suggested he do so 
initially for a few months to see how it would work. Borden, in turn, recommended to 
Perley that he hire a confidential secretary. Perley originally ignored the suggestion but 
then wrote asking the Minister of the Militia, Sir Edward Kemp, to find a “trustworthy, 
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tactful and reticent officer who does not talk too much and would assist me with those 
having troubles and grievances and generally smooth over difficulties. Hard to define his 
duties but they will be important.”
105
 The person, he continued, should be a man of 
experience but not too young, a Conservative but not too partisan. Kemp’s original 
recommendation was ignored by Perley who let the subject drop. But it appears Kemp 
sought the same qualities in a secretary when he took over the office. Harrington, having 
been mayor of Glace Bay, would have been seen as having the experience needed for this 
position. 
Eventually Kemp took over the OMFC while Perley remained High 
Commissioner. Kemp proceeded to assess the organization’s structure, and persuaded the 
Prime Minister to agree to the constitution of a Military Council. Harrington became its 
secretary, an important position given the weight attached by Kemp to systematic 
recording and carrying-out of decisions. 
Although Harrington’s late father had been a law partner with the Prime Minister 
and Harrington had spent a brief time in Borden’s law firm, Borden wrote later that he 
did not get to know Harrington until 1918: 
My chief experience with Gordon Harrington was during the war (where) 
he found his métier in the organization of the Canadian Overseas Ministry. 
Both Sir George Perley and Sir Edward Kemp formed a high opinion of 
Harrington’s character, ability and devotion to duty. He rendered to our 




 Kemp and Harrington set out to prove that the new council would be a healthy 
contrast to Hughes’s version. Procedures resembled those of the Militia Council in 
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Ottawa, with memoranda submitted in advance, a formal agenda, and a formal report on 
decisions reached.
107
 However, an issue that quickly arose was whether or to what extent 
the authority of the new structure would extend to Canadian forces serving at the Front. 
Plans for the reorganization were laid out at a meeting on 2 April 1917 at the War 
Office, attended by among others Kemp, and Harrington as Acting Deputy Minister. 
After some sparring between the Canadians and British, at the meeting and in memoranda 
afterwards, the OMFC was conceded considerable administrative control of Canadian 
troops, qualified by compromise wording “on important matters” drafted by 
Harrington.
108
 “On all important matters, e.g. discipline, allotment of reinforcements, 
establishments, appointments of senior officers, etc.,” was replaced with: “On important 
matters such as allotment of reinforcements, in emergencies, establishments, 
appointment, of General Officers and those which from their relation to military 
operations should properly receive consideration from G.H.Q. France, the Canadian 
authorities will welcome the assistance offered by recommendations sent through G.H.Q. 
France.”
109
  Thus Canada established that while it would hear advice and 
recommendation from the British, final decisions would henceforth be made by Canada. 
The War Office forwarded the changes to Field Marshal Douglas Haig, 
Commander of Allied Forces, who apparently accepted them without comment. 
Harrington realized that considerable discretion would remain with the head of the 
Canadian Section, particularly when matters of administration and organization might 
have a bearing on operations.  
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 With the German offensives creating a crisis in France, Kemp refrained from 
establishing the Canadian Section immediately. However, on 6 May 1917 he visited 
Montreuil and had a brief conference with Haig, delivering a copy of Harrington's 
memorandum and promising to return later with a more detailed statement of the 
proposed functions and composition of the Section. This task was immediately set 
afoot.
110
 At the end of May 1917, Harrington went to France to consult with the officers 
at the Corps. On 1 June he saw Lieutenant General Arthur Currie, Commander of the 
Canadian Corps, and presented him with his memo. Currie accepted the idea of a 
Canadian Section with enthusiasm, seeing in it a further step in the establishment of an 
autonomous Canadian force.
111
 “Much relieved,” noted the historian Desmond Morton, 
“Harrington could now present the British commander-in-chief with both a united front 




Harrington forwarded the memo to the War Office. It was returned with several 
amendments putting Canadian forces squarely under the control of the British. “The 
Overseas Ministry [through Harrington] responded,” Morton continued, “acknowledged 
the letter from the War Office, expressed polite thanks to the G.H.Q. for allowing 
recommendations of general officers to pass through its channels, and ignored the 
rest.”
113
 Nothing more was heard on the matter and the Canadian Section was formally 
established by order-in-council on 22 September 1918. It continued to grow and function 
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until the end of the war when it assumed even greater responsibilities in the 
demobilization of the Corps in France.  
Overall the changes in the organization of the Canadian Forces that created the 
Canadian Section left some 400 surplus officers. Many were returned to Canada where, 
disgruntled, they found political allies in Hughes and others in denouncing the OMFC for 
overstaffing, wasteful administrative practices, and lack of military training or experience 
among the staff. Asked to respond by the Prime Minister, Kemp offered a detailed 
summary of the operations of the OMFC, in which Harrington was taking a key role. It 
was drafted by General Richard Turner: 
The Headquarters of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada have under 
their control for training and administration some One Hundred and One 
Thousand troops in England, and for administration of some One Hundred 
and Fifty Two Thousand troops in France. In these are included all 
branches of military service, and also a matter of over Twelve Thousand 
overseas Casualties in hospital...the Pay Office and the Record Office 
respectively, must deal not only with the accounts and records of every 
Canadian soldier now in the service, but also, every man who has enlisted 





Turner went on to enumerate the reductions in staff that had taken place “during 
the past 18 months” (the time since Hughes’s departure), and noted there was no single 
training facility or hospital large enough to accommodate Canadians but that they were 
concentrated as much as possible close to central administration. “At one time, it was true 
that a large majority of officers employed on administration and training duties in 
England had not seen Overseas Service,” Turner noted, but this had been completely 
remedied. To most of the complaints, Turner responded that the statements referred to 
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operations under Hughes (although he avoided saying so directly) and that steps had been 
taken to correct those situations.
115
 
Harrington acted as deputy minister on several occasions including seven months 
in 1917 and 1918 while Deputy Minister Walter Gow was on extended sick leave in 
Canada. When Gow returned, Harrington – now promoted to Colonel – became deputy 
minister in his own right, following a dispute involving Kemp, Gow and Turner, which 
resulted in Gow’s resignation. Morton wrote that Kemp replaced Gow with “the 
congenial and experienced Colonel Harrington who was on good terms with Kemp and 
the sometimes-prickly Currie.”
116
 Harrington’s correspondence with Currie was direct but 
cordial. On 29 January 1919, Currie wrote Harrington complaining that one of his 
officers who deserved an increase in pay had not received it while another, less 
deserving, did. He wrote: “I am writing to you Harrington because I feel safer in using 
strong language to you knowing you will not take offence, whereas the Minister might 
think otherwise.”
117
 Harrington’s reply was equally direct, pointing out when and where 
he had asked Currie about that situation, but “…instead of sending me this information, 
you write me a letter couched in what you quite modestly term ‘strong language’ and the 
most unfortunate part is that I am afraid I must agree with practically everything you 
say.”
118
 Currie apologized. In another letter, Currie also apologized for not seeing 
Harrington on his trip to London. Reminding Harrington of how he hated London and his 
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Harrington, in turn, held a high opinion of Currie’s dedication to his men. When 
Col. H.M. Urquhart was writing a biography of Sir Arthur Currie he asked Harrington for 
his impressions of the man. Harrington wrote: 
I do remember how concerned, in fact nervous he was before the Corps 
went into action. When the Corps moved in front of Arras in 1918 to 
commence the last stretch I returned to Corps headquarters one morning 
about three o’clock. He was still sitting up reading Henderson’s life of 
Stonewall Jackson and he told me it was impossible for him to sleep. He 
was anxious to have me stay and talk with him for he said he found the 
hardest hours of all just before the engagement commenced. 
 
Harrington went on to say there was not a detail Currie did not go over personally, 
that he felt keenly for those for whom he felt responsible, “and if anything of that kind 
went wrong, his language was lurid.”
120
 
When the war officially ended, military repatriation, bringing the Canadian 
military home from Europe, was the largest movement of people in Canadian history up 
to that time.
121
 To sustain morale while the men awaited transport home, the military 
promoted physical training programs, organized sports, and a wide range of recreational 
activities. It also expanded the Khaki University, first established in 1917, to offer 
courses from elementary to university level to idle troops. Some 50,000 Canadians took 
part in this pioneering education program that prepared veterans for post-war life, and 
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occupied leisure hours while they waited for shipping berths to take them home.
122
 
Harrington’s friend, Rev. Clarence MacKinnon, principal of the Presbyterian College in 
Halifax (later Pine Hill Divinity College), and prominent in labour relations in Cape 
Breton in the 1920s, was one of the original promoters of the Khaki University.
123
 
Although plans for demobilization began long before the war was over, different 
ideas of how it should be done overlooked how it could be done. Ottawa wanted soldiers 
brought back in the order of those for whom jobs existed. The British had tried and 
abandoned that proposal. There was a proposal to give the men a vacation in Europe 
before they returned to Canada. The Prime Minister favoured this plan. Harrington, faced 
with the prospect of trying to gather up tens of thousands of men from across Europe, 
saw the plan as totally unworkable and convinced Kemp to argue for soldiers returning to 
Canada under military discipline.
124
 Currie wanted to bring each corps back as a unit so 
that they would return to their communities as heroes. This plan was unworkable as well 
because it meant that men who “arrived late” would return before longer-serving 
veterans.
125
 Delays were caused by a shortage of ships, longshoremen’s strikes in Britain 
and more important, the inability of Canadian ports to berth the troopships. Saint John 
and Halifax were the only large, ice-free Canadian ports, and the latter was still 
rebuilding from the massive explosion the previous year that had destroyed most 
dockside facilities. As well, Canadian railroads could initially promise only 25,000 
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Added to that, the conditions under which the first group sailed for home were 
considered so bad it created a scandal in Canada. Regardless how anxious the men (and 
women) were to get home, for some time, the order from Canada was that Canadians 
returning home required accommodations that were of better quality than those provided 
to servicemen from other countries.
127
 A cattle boat offered for troop shipment was 
condemned out of hand. The ship was supposed to transport men from the crowded 
Kinmel camp that was filled with frustrated, tired, poorly fed and, in most cases, 
penniless men. On the night of 4 March a riot erupted. 
According to the Canadian Great War Project, most of the 17,000 men at Kinmel 
belonged to the railway and forestry corps. They had never seen combat and had never 
left Britain.
128
 Nevertheless they waited in crowded conditions, in the cold with no 
money. During the two-day riot, the men attacked all the areas and organizations they felt 
had taken advantage of them but bypassed the Salvation Army operation, which they 
thought had treated them fairly.
129
 Harrington called for an investigation. It was headed 
by General James MacBrien but was incomplete because the arrival of ships transported 
witnesses. The Olympic, earlier considered too big for Halifax Harbour, suddenly became 
an appropriate troop carrier.
130
 One of the ships pressed into service was the Mauritania 
and one of its passengers was Sir Edward Kemp, ill and suffering the loss of two sons-in-
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law within months of each other. From Canada, Kemp complained about confusion, 
chaos and ineptitude at the dock. Harrington told him that the cause of the upset was the 
last-minute attempt to fill vacancies with drafts from Kinmel.
131
A report detailing the 
causes of the Kinmel riot was outlined in a document signed and distributed by 
Harrington to the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General on 22 March for 
further investigation: “You might kindly take immediate steps to have the necessary 
information on these points and any others appearing from the Proceedings, collected.”
132
 
Further uprisings would occur at Whitley and Epsom, among others. Sadly, the British 
media blew all these events out of proportion. Newspapers that covered the Kinmel affair 
added their own sensationalism. The Times (of London) initially reported, and later 
recanted, that the rioters had killed a Victoria Cross winner. It also reported that given the 
discipline and record of Canadian Troops since the beginning of the war, The Kinmel 
Incident was to be regretted and it also regretted that “reports of the incident have been 
exaggerated.”133 
Turner promised severe repercussions if soldiers did not improve their behavior 
but it is likely that increased efforts to get the men home slowed and eventually ended the 
uprisings. By August, 1919 most Canadian soldiers and their dependents had left Britain 
for Canada.  
With the end of hostilities and the removal of Canadian soldiers from Europe, the 
OMFC and its deputy minister were still concerned with issues related to missing 
Canadians, graves and grave stones, soldiers in hospital, disposal of goods and 
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settlements with the British War Office. Hospitals such as Cliveden and Saint Dunstan’s 
still contained injured Canadian soldiers. Mrs. Waldorf Astor, feeling she had done her 
part for the war effort, wrote the Prime Minister in December 1918, asking to have her 
house, Cliveden, back. Borden forwarded the request to Kemp who told Borden that he 
would like to comply with her request but there were no convalescent hospitals in Canada 
and he “couldn’t foresee moving the patients for some time to come.”
134
 One such 
hospital was Saint Dunstan’s where Katherine Harrington volunteered with blind soldiers 
to fit them for jobs in Canada.
135
 
 General James MacBrien was one of the staff of OMFC who stayed in London 
after the war to help close down the Canadian operation. He faced many challenges 
dealing with the disposal of goods and equipment including the slowness of the British 
military in assessing the value of Canadian equipment. Harrington wrote that he 
understood that the British were quite right in not wanting to commit themselves to 
taking on Dominion stores at a loss. In a letter to the Secretary of the War Office, 
Harrington suggested, and the War Office agreed, as a practical solution for the stores 
and equipment, that:  
...the total equipment of the Canadian Units in France, including those articles 
mentioned in our letter of the 11th November, excepting the personal equipment 
of the men, and rifles, be turned in to the Imperial Ordnance Department in 
France, and that Canada should receive serviceable equipment in [sic] of such 
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While Harrington himself was en route to Canada, MacBrien wrote Kemp that the 
reorganization [report] Harrington was bringing contained a list of items for sale that 
“will pretty well clear us out.”
137
 He added that problems had arisen at points of 
embarkation where officers and their families were being overcharged for first class 
accommodation. 
 In late 1919, John C. Douglas, a Cape Breton Member of Parliament, and another 
former mayor organized a dinner for Harrington in Sydney and asked Kemp for a 
telegram that could be read during the dinner. Kemp responded with: 
 [Harrington’s] services to Canada as Deputy Minister of Overseas Military 
Forces have been invaluable. He possessed those very high qualities which 
particularly fitted him for the arduous task which he had to perform particularly 
after Armistice when nearly all officers who had spent long periods overseas 
desired to return to their homes in Canada. The Officers with whom he had 
intimate relations as well as myself have the highest personal regard for him and I 




From Ottawa a few weeks later, Harrington wrote MacBrien telling him how a 
short hunting trip saw his health “much improved” but word of “congestion” in Ottawa 
cut short his holiday. He commiserated with MacBrien for the delays in closing up affairs 
in England and ended that while he would like to see him, “still I trust I will not be here 
when you come out, and will be quite willing to substitute meeting you in Halifax or 
almost anywhere other than Ottawa.”
139
 
Problems in Britain, including strikes, continued to be a hindrance to MacBrien’s 
efforts to leave England. Harrington, anxious to get MacBrien to Ottawa so that he could 
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leave, offered suggestions on the many files still active and hinted at a personal 
motivation.  
No one appears to appreciate the fact that until you come over and bring 
that place with you, Sir Edward Kemp has practically set his mind on 
keeping me around here and no one at all appears to realize that the last 
thing in the world that I want to do, and from my own point of view 
should do, is to stay here any longer…Everybody seem to be in fairly 




Harrington’s main complaint about being in Ottawa, although he disliked the city, 
was that he believed that the duties he was performing should be done by military staff. 
But while he was anxious to return to civilian life, he wanted to make sure that all care 
was taken in closing up operations finally and properly, leaving nothing unresolved or 
unreported. 
In March, 1920, Harrington was still in Ottawa. Kemp was in his seventh week of 
illness and work slowed in Britain when MacBrien was admitted to hospital for an 
operation, the nature of which was not mentioned in the correspondence. Harrington was 
trying to impress upon the Militia Department the importance of MacBrien and his team 
being in Ottawa before the official shutting down of the OMFC at the end of the 
Parliamentary session, likely sometime that April.
141
 MacBrien was still in Britain in 
early April, 1920, when Harrington was again on his way there, to negotiate a financial 
settlement with the British War Office 
According to Morton, “No problem bulked larger or was more important to the 
reputation of the Overseas Ministry than the final settlement of the financial 
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arrangements with the British. Few problems could be more complex.”
142
 Kemp was 
scheduled to lead the negotiations but at the last moment, his doctor refused to let him 
sail. He cabled Harrington that he was “under the impression you can clean up the 
financial matters with the War Office and Canteen Funds. If you find it necessary, cable 
frequently. …advise what credit you require and as far as is practicable have someone 
preserve details in case they should be demanded.”
143
 
Harrington was not new to financial negotiations. They had actually begun under 
Perley when the War Office realized it had agreed too quickly to pay five shillings per 
man per day for men in France and an extra shilling for ammunition and payment for all 
accommodation for Canadian troops in England. Perley agreed on 2 March 1917 to re-
open negotiations but only from that day on, not retroactively. The War Office 
continually emphasized its estimation that Canada owed £4 million. By the time Kemp 
arrived to take over the OMFC, things had become much more complicated. As the war 
dragged on, Canada became increasingly reluctant to assume all the costs of the CEF.
144
 
Harrington had become involved in the negotiations at least by 1919 when he forwarded 
a letter to H.C. Gordon at the Finance Department of the War Office in February of 
1919.
145
 Back in London in 1920, Harrington was able quickly to settle some of the more 
minor issues with the War Office. Others, he observed to Gordon, took longer: 
Liability for claim operations Forestry Corps raised between War Office, 
Board of Trade, Air Ministry, settlement now reached. Credit will be 
about one and one quarter million sterling. Better than expected. Chief 
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questions left are, against us horses, command claims, Against War Office 
undrawn equipment, artillery, vehicles. Will cable general balance 
indicated ascertained. Also attempting agree principle for settlement with 




 Although Harrington was anxious to end his military life and get back home, he 
reported that by the end of the second week of negotiations, things were moving very 
slowly because of the British insistence on examining the accounts minutely: 
for without doing so they are not in a position to state how we stand 
generally. This has taken some little time but it has impressed me very 
fully with the necessity of obtaining a complete settlement while I am 
here. I am firmly convinced that unless I effect such an arrangement, I will 
leave some unfortunate matters outstanding  that will breed trouble 
especially among officers who are not familiar with them in Canada and 





Agreement was finally reached on 27 May 1920 on Harrington’s recommendation 
for half a million pounds sterling paid by Canada to Britain which Harrington argued  
may not have been completely exact but did substantial justice to the taxpayers of Britain 
and Canada alike.
148
 On 29 June 1920, Kemp wrote the Prime Minister complimenting 
Harrington on bringing the negotiations to a conclusion at an amount substantially lower 
than had been anticipated. Kemp also pointed out that Harrington, so far, had been paid 
nothing for expenses. He recommended a reimbursement of $4500 and then turned to the 
matter of Harrington’s health: 
In addition to the above, you are aware that Colonel Harrington as Deputy 
Minister has performed splendid service for Canada and is now anxious to 
be demobilized and work up a law practice in Nova Scotia. In the 
meantime, however, it is necessary for him to take an extended rest as his 
health has been more or less impaired through strenuous work. I feel, 
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therefore  that the least that can be done for him by the Government is to 
grant him six months leave of absence with pay and allowances which this 




Borden replied that he had congratulated Harrington on his results and confirmed 
that “he has certainly been a very capable and devoted officer throughout” adding that he 
was sending for him that day in order to start him on his holiday as soon as possible.
150
 
On 5 July, the Committee of the Privy Council voted that Harrington be 
reimbursed $4500, and that upon his demobilization he immediately be granted six 
months’ leave of absence with pay and allowances.
151
 Like many others who served 
overseas in staff capacities, Harrington had been overworked to the point of exhaustion 
and now faced adjusting to civilian life with complications from health issues.
152
 In 
addition, in October 1918 he had spent 10 days in hospital with Spanish Influenza. Later 
studies showed that Spanish “flu” had lasting repercussions,
153
 and it is entirely possible 
that Harrington’s recovery was less than complete. Following his return to Canada, 
outdoor pursuits helped. After leaving Ottawa he spent a month hunting and fishing in 
New Brunswick (where, although on holiday, he was contacted to deal with a military 
matter). 
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On 23 August 1920 Harrington wrote Kemp that his heath had improved 
considerably and he planned to spend time in the country in Cape Breton, adding that he 
had finally found a house in Sydney and some office space on Charlotte Street. Despite 
the promised six months’ vacation, Kemp asked him to return to Ottawa to put together a 
final report for the government.
154
 Harrington resisted, pointing out that before he left 
Ottawa he had organized all the material related to the settlement with War Office and 
put it into the safe marked for Kemp personally.
155
 
Harrington told Kemp that “it surprised me not a little no single department of the 
Government has yet called upon my services here [in Sydney],” and added he suspected 
many of his pre-war clients had found other lawyers during his five year absence.
156
 He 
admitted in a letter to Kemp, however, that the because of having little work, he was able 
to have more opportunities to get out into the country. In November, Harrington wrote, 
“Though it is a little chilly yet, the country here is very beautiful and I believe it is the 
greatest thing to patch my nervous system.”
157
 
In January, 1921, Kemp again asked Harrington when he could come to Ottawa to 
put the finishing touches on a report on the OMFC. Harrington replied that he was unable 
to come because he had been “flat on his back” for the first two weeks of the year and 
had since been recuperating. He said he would ask his doctor when he would be able to 
travel but suspected it would be at least a fortnight. “The effects of the last three years 
over-work,” he said, “take time and careful treatment to overcome.” The letter went on to 
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explain how the report might be handled.
158
 By mid-February his health had improved 
and he believed himself able to travel to Ottawa if needed. However, a letter he wrote to 
Kemp on 22 February suggested that ultimately there was no need:  
I acknowledge your letter of 18 February enclosing a copy of P.C. Order 
408. From a very cursory glance at it there appears to me ample material 
placed before the Government to ratify my actions last summer [the 
financial  negotiations with Britain] and practically the whole story is 
there for any one to elaborate who knows the facts, It is quite unlikely 
such an elaboration will be necessary for among other reasons we closed 
at about one million within our estimates, Practically all this amount is 
accounted for by that settlement, I am forced to assume that the 
Government is grateful, not merely for the money saving but as well for 
the relief from future entanglements on our account. I should have liked 
Dowie, Capt. Ross and Capt. Martin to have been rewarded in some 




In May 1922, Harrington had been again working as senior counsel to the United 
Mine Workers of America in Cape Breton for four months when he and MacBrien were 
called to Ottawa to appear at the Liberal government’s public accounts committee to 
answer questions concerning overseas financial practices at the end of the First World 
War. The partisan inquiry seems to have been searching for inadequacies in his and 
MacBrien’s responses to questions concerning the operations of the OMFC. Probably in 
reference to the early days of the war when there were officers at OMFC who had not 
served at the Front, Harrington was asked what service he had performed at the Front, to 
which he answered simply, “Intelligence.”
160
 The committee stated it was satisfied that 
Harrington had given a clear account of events although the Chair admitted he found it 
astonishing that Harrington had actually convinced the British War Office to pay for 
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materials for which Canada could produce no records.
161
 Years later, Harrington wrote 
Conservative Senator, Sir Arthur Meighen stating that although the committee claimed to 
be anxious that he be paid as an expert witness in addition to his expenses, he had only 
been paid a small portion of his account.
162
 
Harrington, overseas, soon earned the trust and respect of his superiors and 
colleagues. No records have been found to indicate why he was transferred to the OMFC, 
but, once there, it was his capacity for leadership and his administrative ability that led 
him to be appointed Deputy Minister of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada at the 
age of thirty-five and after several months as acting deputy minister. Normally, it would 
seem that a former Mayor of Glace Bay who negotiated how Canadian troops were to be 
used by the “Mother Country,” negotiated policy, procedures and financial matters with 
the British War Office would have aspired to a prestigious national or international 
position after the war. But none of this appears to have led him to any greater aspirations 
than to return to Cape Breton, open a law office, and enjoy the peace he found in the 














District 26, Besco and the Communists 
1920 to 1925 
The respect that Gordon S. Harrington earned, and the contacts and friendships he 
made at the OMFC, could have led him to prestigious administrative or political positions 
in either Canada or the United Kingdom.
1
 Instead, he and Katherine bought a house in 
Sydney, Cape Breton, and he opened an office on Charlotte Street sometime in the 
summer of 1920. Sydney was less than twenty miles from Glace Bay but had a far 
different culture from the town where he had launched his legal career, been legal counsel 
for the UMW, and served as mayor. He told Sir Edward Kemp that he needed peace, and 
exposure to the outdoors, to maintain his health, which had been badly damaged during 
the war. To judge from a letter to Kemp in which he commented that expected 
government contracts had not materialized and that former clients might have found other 
legal counsel during his five-year absence, it appears that he did plan to live a quiet life.
2
 
Harrington’s six months’ pay from the federal government ended with his demobilization 
on 5 January 1921, but he had not totally recovered his health.  Later in January, he 
informed Kemp that he had been “flat on his back” for the first two weeks of the year.
3
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This letter of 25 January was written on the letterhead of the law firm Harrington, 
Forbes & Campbell.
4
 The firm’s major client was District 26 of the United Mine Workers 
of America (UMW). Harrington, now thirty-seven years old, war-weary and with 
recurring health problems became its senior counsel, coming full circle to his pre-war 
days. Serving as senior counsel for District 26 of the UMW in Cape Breton in the 
tumultuous early 1920s may have seemed an unlikely role for a man who claimed that 
peace and quiet was necessary for his health. District 26 had lost its charter following the 
disastrous strike of 1909-1910, but through a series of amalgamations, it regained its 
status in 1919. However, struggles between the coal company and the union, as well as 
friction within the union, would persist for years to come.  
Although the years 1920 to 1925 were the most turbulent times in the history of 
the UMW District 26, particularly in Cape Breton, neither Harrington’s role nor his 
personality appears to have attracted attention. However, articles written after he became 
a member of the Nova Scotia Legislature were quite consistent in describing his physical 
appearance, his abilities and his personality. In office, he was described as a man of about 
five foot-seven in height with a slight build, who gave the appearance that he would be 
happier reading a book or fishing on the Mira River in Cape Breton than being in 
politics.
5
 Andrew Merkel of the Canadian Press admired Harrington's sincerity, charm, 
intelligence and ability to discuss a wide variety of subjects, and yet he noted that in 
debate there was no one quicker or more biting and caustic.
6
 Historian Murray Beck 
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claimed that Harrington was not as good a debater as his predecessor in the Premier's 
office, E.N. Rhodes, but possessed more of the common touch and warmth that was 
lacking in Rhodes.
7
 E.R. Forbes quoted former Liberal organizer Leo Dolan, who 
characterized Harrington as “a soldier-turned-administrator, decisive in action,” and 
“ruthless against opponents whether inside or without his own party.”
8
Hector 
Charlesworth, editor of Saturday Night magazine, found Harrington pleasant company 
and a good story-teller but “no back slapper.”
9
 
 Although born into a Conservative family, Harrington, well known to be much 
more socially progressive than the Conservative Party of the day, trod his own path. 
Owen wrote, “He developed, and never feared to openly express ideas and theories about 
industrial conditions that disconcerted orthodox Conservatives and at times drew barrages 
from both political camps.”
10
 Despite his well-honed negotiating skills, there were those, 
including Finlay MacDonald, Conservative MP from Sydney, who said that Harrington 
had no natural flair for politics. This was said after Harrington had won his seat in three 
consecutive elections.
11
 Beck wrote that unlike Rhodes, who was an orthodox 
Conservative, Harrington would have become known as a “Red Tory,” one who regretted 
that financial conditions prevented him from “moving towards the social ends he 
favoured.”
12
 Sir Robert Borden congratulated Harrington on his election to the legislature 
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in 1925, offering good wishes for “this new sphere of usefulness.”
13
 In response, 
Harrington thanked Borden for his inspiration and added, “It is only the firm conviction 
that I may be of some service…that has induced me to enter a sphere of life that for years 
has been distasteful to me, and at the same time to abandon that quiet and secluded form 
of existence that attracts me most.”
14 
In 1921, however, the decision to re-enter active political life lay well in the 
future.  For now, Harrington would have been well aware of the effects of the post-war 
depression on businesses nationally and internationally and that the effects of the 
downturn would be felt more profoundly in Cape Breton. Steelmaking was on the decline 
and coal markets in Ontario and Quebec were impeded by both imports from the United 
States and a significant increase in freight rates.
15
 As well, contracts at the Sydney Steel 
plant were short term, lessening the demand for coal.
16
 But in the early 1920s coal from 
District 26 still accounted for nearly half the coal sold in Quebec and Ontario, and was a 
substantial source of income for the Nova Scotia government.
17
 Both federal and 
provincial governments were anxious to keep the coal coming to market. 
In April 1921, three months after Harrington joined Forbes & Campbell, a new 
business venture would exacerbate the tensions already existing within the coal and steel 
industries.
18
 Roy Wolvin was a relatively young entrepreneur, originally from the United 
States, whose success in developing ports on the Great Lakes led to an invitation for him 
to manage the construction of the Halifax Shipyards after the 1917 Halifax Explosion. 
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Wolvin saw a larger opportunity. He began buying shares in Dominion and Nova Scotia 
Steel. He established a working relationship with a similar-minded group based in 
London whose plan was to use Canadian resources to revitalize British industry in the 
face of American competition. The proposed merger of nine companies set up a storm of 
controversy in the House of Commons and to avoid an investigation, the British Empire 
Steel Company was incorporated in Nova Scotia with wide powers for a fee of $75,000 .19 
According to Frank, having gained investors internationally at a time when markets were 
diminishing, Wolvin and his directors pursued two central goals: to reduce the cost of 
labour power in the coal industry and to recruit state support for the coal and steel 
industries in the national market.
20
 
Recruiting state support, at least from the Nova Scotia Government, was easily 
attainable; reducing labour costs would prove much more difficult. Prior to the arrival of 
Besco,  incomes were not keeping pace with inflation, and although the miners saw wage 
increases in January and July of 1918, “In the face of rising prices the wage rates were 
not sufficient to bring about permanent improvements in real wages.”
21
 Conditions in the 
coalfields of Cape Breton may have appealed to Harrington’s sense of responsibility. He 
had been mayor of Glace Bay and no doubt would have been re-elected if he had not 
recruited hundreds of men in the area to join him in going off to war. Those and other 
veterans who came back from the war, likely damaged, found themselves and their 
families trapped in substandard housing and broken work time. Sir Arthur Currie wrote 
that: 
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The health of almost everyone who served throughout the war was, to 
some extent, adversely affected. Men may not have been wounded, not 
have suffered from any illness, but I do not believe that any man could go 




   
After five years overseas Harrington’s fellow-veterans came back to company 
housing that continued to deteriorate, growing poverty and chronic health and education 
problems.  There had been little improvement in the lives of the coal miners and now 
after the war, too many miners who expected a better life faced too few jobs and too few 
markets for coal.  
Perhaps Harrington believed the task of being legal counsel for the union would 
see him being useful as well as being in a position similar to that of the deputy minister of 
OMFC where he worked largely behind the scenes.
23
 But by early in 1922 he had clearly 
made his mark in negotiating a settlement between the UMW and Besco, and in 1923 
when a strike was threatened at the Sydney Steel Plant, C.B., Wade wrote, “Once more 
Harrington was called and once again he cobbled together some kind of a settlement.”
24
 
 Between 1920 and 1922, at least four federal commissions of inquiry examined 
the relationship between the miners and the operators of the coal industry with varying 
degrees of success.
25
 The first, which led to what became known as the MacKinnon 
Award, was chaired by Rev. Clarence MacKinnon, Principal of the Presbyterian College 
in Halifax, and a returned veteran. In1920 MacKinnon reviewed many job categories and 
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leveled wage rates across the industry.
26
 Nevertheless, the miners were not satisfied.  
James Morrison, research director of the UMW circa 1945, wrote that prior to the Award, 
men with large families or with disabilities had been paid higher wages.
27
Other 
seemingly rare examples of cooperation between the company and the men included a 
meeting between the company’s Assistant General Manager, H.J. McCann and 
representatives of the miners in March, 1921. McCann had just returned from a meeting 
with executives of the mining company in Montreal. He reported that due to the 
continuing depression in the market it would likely be necessary to close some mines. 
The union suggested and the company agreed that it made more sense to put all the mines 
on part time so that all miners would have some income. The company, at that time, had 
markets for only 100,000 tons and already had 160,000 tons banked at New Aberdeen. 
28
 
Wade, Frank, and others write of a time of constant strife between an intransigent 
company bound to starve its employees into submission on one side and a communist-
influenced union aimed at the destruction of the capitalist system on the other. With the 
arrival of Besco, the situation turned to a continuing crisis with the ultra-capitalist Wolvin 
pitted against the communist, J.B. McLachlan, who as secretary-treasurer of the UMW 
became its public voice. Yet, there were those on both sides who aimed for a middle 
ground and it would seem that Gordon Harrington, at least in the beginning, would 
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choose to travel that middle ground while at the same time providing counsel to those on 
the radical wing when required.  
Although the federal commissions failed for various reasons, all commented on 
the appalling living conditions in company housing and how those conditions affected not 
only the productivity of current miners, but also the health, education and expectations of 
the children. Harrington would ask that company housing be considered in the 
deliberations of the Duncan Royal Commission of 1925.
29
 
 When the fourth inquiry, the Gillan Commission, began its investigation in 
January of 1922, Besco, without waiting for the outcome, cut wages. Harrington appeared 
before Justice Benjamin Russell on behalf of District No. 26 of the UMW to argue that 
the company, by cutting wages, had defied the rules of the Industrial Disputes Act. Justice 
Russell granted an injunction against Besco on 30 December 1921, basing his decision on 
the inadequate notice and the fact that the conciliation board had not reported.
30
 The 
company appealed. A two-to-one decision by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 
overturned the injunction on 10 January, 1922, stating that both parties planned to 
renegotiate the agreement, and therefore there was no onus on the company to comply 
with the Act.
31
The decision was written by Supreme Court Justice Humphrey Mellish, 
former solicitor for the Dominion Coal Company.
32
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 On 25 July 1917, an explosion in No. 12 mine in New Waterford killed 65 miners. Three coal company 
officials were charged with negligence. Humphrey Mellish, senior counsel for the coal company, prepared 
the company’s defence. By the time the case came to trial, Mellish had been appointed to the Bench and 





Negotiations continued unsuccessfully. In April, 1922 the federal government 
offered the union the opportunity to reopen the Gillan Commission, which had 
recommended a cut in wages in February. The miners had rejected the results of the 
Commission and saw no point in having the same commission review information on 
which it had already commented. To that end, the miners sent a telegram to Prime 




Rather than agree to this request, the federal government convened yet another 
inquiry. This Scott Commission also failed. Then in August, the annual election of 
District 26 saw the moderates, Robert Baxter, William Delaney and Silby Barrett, lose to 
the radical wing of the union.
34
 The new executive ordered a 100 per cent strike to begin 
on 15 August if the company did not provide “a distinctly increased wage rate.”
35
 Such a 
strike would see the maintenance men removed from the mines. This prospect seemed to 
send Besco president Wolvin and Nova Scotia Public Works Minister Armstrong into a 
panic. Wolvin began a barrage of letters and cables to the Prime Minister claiming the 
mines were about to be destroyed and begging for military intervention. To each of 
Wolvin’s telegrams and letters Prime Minister Mackenzie King made the same response: 
military aid to a civil power was outside the jurisdiction of the federal government and 
could only be enacted by local authorities.
36
 The mayor of Glace Bay, D.W. Morrison, a 
moderate member of the UMW and a friend of Harrington’s, refused to sign the 
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requisition for troops requested by the company and made it clear that the town would 
not pay for any troops sent into the area. Their presence, he said, would aggravate the 
situation.
37
In his reply to Morrison, King said he was sending him the same information 
he had given Wolvin, that the federal government had no authority in the situation.
38
 
When Morrison refused to order the troops, Besco approached Judge Duncan Finlayson 
who signed the requisition and troops headed to the coalfields.
39
 A letter from Eugene 
Fiset, Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, to Hugh Ross, a barrister in Sydney, 
outlining the means by which the militia can be called out ended by observing that, “one 
of the first questions which arises is as to whether they were legally called out, or 
whether the Military Officers did not act too hastily in obeying a panicky summons.”
40
 
 Six months earlier, on 22 December, 1921, General H. C. Thacker, commander of 
Militia District 6 headquartered in Halifax and including all of Nova Scotia, was already 
preparing for an uprising in the coalfields. He wrote the Secretary of the Militia Council 
in Ottawa to say that along with press reports, he was advised by an active militia 
member who was also an official at one of the coal companies that “vague and random 
threats of violence have reached him indirectly as possible in case an agreement is not 
reached between operators and employees before the wage cut comes into operation.”
41
 
Thacker, a veteran of the Boer War and of the First World War, seemed to be taking fears 
of revolution to a new level by ordering more and more troops, and requesting both a 
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nearby British warship and intervention by the fledgling Canadian air force.
42
 The Prime 
Minister did ensure that Thacker’s plans were controlled. Mackenzie King’s file on 
labour unrest in Cape Breton includes letters from the mayor of Glace Bay, the Great War 
Veterans’ Association (GWVA), Rev. Munro of Chalmers United Church in New 
Aberdeen, Dr. M.T. Sullivan, the Liberal Medical Officer of Health, various labour 
groups and, of course, those from Wolvin. To all he responded that the federal 
government had no role to play in ordering troops to Cape Breton. To Armstrong’s 
request for Mounted Police, Mackenzie King is reported to have said, “if we wished to 
create an industrial disturbance of very serious proportions, possibly the best way we 
could go about it would be to order the Mounted Police into those areas." He had, at that 
time, informed the local authorities (in Nova Scotia) that "if they were unable to maintain 
law and order themselves, as they were supposed to do", they could call in the militia but 
he assured them that they would be responsible for expenses incurred.
43
 
Harrington would have known that the arrival of the militia would lend support to 
the radicals but there is no evidence to show whether he used his military contacts to try 
to restrain Thacker. MacBrien was away from his post as Chief of Staff at the Department 
of National Defence, but General Currie retained considerable influence there. And 
Harrington himself had had a direct connection with Thacker. In an informal letter to 
MacBrien in December 1919, Harrington updated him on his holiday including news of 
some of their colleagues and said that while in Halifax he had seen Thacker “and wound 









up on a 10 day hunting trip to New Brunswick.” It is not clear if the two statements are 
related but it does establish a connection between Harrington and Thacker.
44
 
 Henry Spracklin and William McDonald, president and secretary respectively of 
the GWVA, no doubt supported by GWVA members including Harrington and Morrison, 
wrote Labour Minister James Murdock arguing that if a military presence was needed, 
members of the GWVA could fill that role.
45
 Mayor Morrison, a member of the provincial 
legislature representing the Farmer-Labour Party, and a member of the UMW, issued the 
following statement: 
I have been today twice requested to sign a requisition for troops and 
have refused. I have refused because I felt that there is no need for troops 
in here. There is absolutely no disorder, much less violence. To bring 
armed men into the district under these circumstances is, in my opinion, 




Armstrong cabled Federal Finance Minister W.S. Fielding that “the 
militia...couldn't cope and 2000 men were needed to protect the mines.”
47
 He also asked 
the Federal Justice Minister to send RCMP to help the Provincial Police force.
48
 The 
military arrived and set up on 16 August at No. 2 yard (New Aberdeen) and apparently 
did not stray from there.
49
 
 On 19 August 1922, Premier George Murray, from his home in North Sydney, 
sent for Gordon Harrington and the executive of the UMW. Following their meeting, the 
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executive agreed to send the maintenance men back to work.
50
A week later on 26 August 
the Glace Bay Gazette reported, “Eleven o’clock last night saw the close of the four days’ 
conference between U.M.W. executive and officials of B.E.S. corporation. The session 
yesterday lasted eleven hours. Rev. C.H. MacKinnon and Col. Gordon Harrington were 
present and assisted the parties in reaching an agreement.”
51
 The Toronto Star reported:  
At one o’clock this morning Col. Gordon Harrington representing the 
miners, F.W. Gray for the British Empire Steel Corporation and Dr. 
Clarence MacKinnon principal of Pine Hill Presbyterian College, Halifax, 
who had been called in as an extra mediator emerged from the conference 
room and announced that an agreement had been reached. Col. 
Harrington, legal adviser of the united miner workers spoke to the press. 
“After considerable negotiations I believe a mutually satisfactory program 
has been concluded. The attitude of the conference throughout has been 





 Both newspapers outlined the main details of the agreement: a minimum rate of 
$3.25 per day with a minimum raise of 40 cents per day; rates to include Sydney Mines, 
and contract rates to be increased by 12½ per cent. Both papers reported that the 
outstanding feature of the settlement was the long-term contract, something for which the 
miners had long been arguing.  
In June of 1925, the Sydney Post carried a statement from a former Besco vice-
president, D. H. McDougall, who had resigned in 1923, claiming that Harrington, who 
was hired by Murray’s Liberal government to negotiate a settlement in the dispute 
between the UMW and Besco in August 1922, had not been paid “one cent” for his 
services in connection with the settlement of that coal strike. McDougall said that 
                                                   
50
 Wade, History of District 26; MacGillivray, “Military Aid to the Civil Power,” 85. 
51
 Glace Bay Gazette, 26 August 1922. 
52
 Toronto Star, 26 August 1922. The Toronto Star stated that Harrington reported at 1 a. m., likely the time 





Colonel Harrington “rendered the Government and the Province laudable service in 
helping to bring the 1922 strike to an end. On the other hand, McDougall said, MLA 
D.A. Cameron, (who was also present at the negotiations) was paid $2,300 out of the 
Provincial Treasury for prosecuting rioters during the strike. McDougall said that, 
“Harrington’s services combined with the profound respect both the Company and the 
Unin [sic] had for his honesty and integrity were exclusively responsible for the 
settlement that was reached.”
53
 
The same edition of the newspaper quoted Harrington as saying that from18 
August 1922 until the wage agreement was signed on 1 October, he had been in the 
continuous employ of the Nova Scotia Government.
54
 Harrington claimed the settlement 
saved the government $200,000 to $300,000, including the cost of the 1500 soldiers and 
200 provincial police at a daily cost of about $10,000 for the time they were in Cape 
Breton. The days the mines were not working also meant a loss of royalties at between 
$2000 and $3000. He said he stopped MacDougall, MacKinnon and Independent Labour 
MLA Forman Waye from publicly contradicting the Liberal press when it gave credit to 
Liberal MLA D.A. Cameron for settling the strike.
55
 Harrington said that both the union 
and the company were aware he was employed by the government. The new agreement 
was to run until 15 January 1924, giving the men more security with the longer-term 
contract but in July of 1923, the men were again on strike. 
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The Maritime Labor Herald began publishing in the fall of 1922.56 The paper was 
funded by District 26 and distributed free to its members. The paper also started a short-
lived Labour Club aimed at public education where prominent people such as Rev. 
Clarence MacKinnon, Rev. J.J. Tompkins of Saint Francis Xavier University, and Gordon 
Harrington were invited to speak.
57
 Within a short time, original founders Robert Baxter 
and Silby Barrett left the paper as it became the voice of the radical left. J.B. McLachlan, 
secretary treasurer of the union, would not have a formal position on the paper until 1924 
but from the beginning he provided most of the anti-capitalist copy.
58
 
At the same time, communist activity increased in the region. Glace Bay was on 
the speaking circuit for many socialist and communist orators. During 1923 Harrington 
defended three well-known communists in court. One was Malcolm Bruce, organizer for 
the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). He spoke at the Savoy Theatre in Glace Bay. 
Following the speech a warrant was issued for his arrest on the charge of making 
seditious utterances at a public meeting. Determined to rid the province of “Reds,” Nova 
Scotia Attorney General Walter O'Hearn traveled to Glace Bay to personally prosecute 
the case in front of Stipendiary Magistrate, A.B. McGillivray. O’Hearn attempted to have 
Bruce convicted of making seditious utterances at a public meeting. Harrington mounted 
a defence that saw the charges dismissed in June. In the interim, O’Hearn’s warrant for 
Bruce’s arrest allowed police to search McLachlan’s home from which a quantity of 
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 More labour trouble had already begun at the Sydney Steel plant in the spring of 
1923 when an employee, Syd McNeil, was fired for insubordination and the rest of the 
men walked out in sympathy. Harrington was called, and an agreement was reached that 
sent the men back to work.
60
 Then on Thursday, 28 June 1923, of the 2800 dayshift 
workers at the steel plant, approximately 1800 walked off the job seeking an eight-hour 
day and recognition of their union. Around 1000 initially remained at their posts, while 
the 1000 strong night shift “scabbed” throughout the strike.
61
 One striker remembered 
that so many workers stayed on the job that picket-line violence inevitably ensued.
62 
On the Thursday and Friday nights, strikers stormed #4 gate on Victoria Road 
with the intention of removing those who continued to work. Even with the help of the 
company police, the 20-man Sydney police force could not continue to contain the 
strikers, who broke holes in the fence to try to shut down the plant and threw rocks at the 
police. Twice the magistrate came to read the Riot Act but had to withdraw when he was 
pelted with stones. Troops from Halifax and Quebec arrived after Besco again asked 
Judge Duncan Finlayson to request military aid to the civil power. Evidence at the trial of 
J. B. McLachlan was that on Friday night, the newly-arrived soldiers fired shots over the 
heads of the strikers and as a result, things were calm on Saturday night.
63
 Provincial 
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police arrived on Sunday, 1 July 1923 and on Sunday night 16 police officers from that 
force armed with batons and mounted on horseback rode through the crowd at # 4 gate 
and attacked people on Victoria Road in Whitney Pier.
64 
Following the attack by the provincial police, McLachlan sent a letter to union 
locals outlining alleged atrocities committed by the police. The letter alleged that a 
seventy-year old woman had been beaten senseless and was close to death, a nine-year 
old had a broken breast bone from a horse’s hoof, and that a pregnant woman gave birth 
prematurely and the baby died. He went on: 
The Government of Nova Scotia is the guilty and responsible party for this 
crime, No miner or mine worker can remain at work while this 
Government turns Sydney into a jungle, to do so is to sink your manhood 
and allow Armstrong and his miserable bunch of grafting politicians to 
trample your last shred of freedom in the sand. Call a meeting of your 
Local at once and decide to spread the fight against Armstrong to every 
mine in Nova Scotia. Act at once. Tomorrow may be too late.
65 
 
The miners went out on strike, demanding that the troops and the provincial 
police be removed from Sydney. District 26 President, Dan Livingstone delivered a copy 
of McLachlan’s letter to Besco Vice President D.H. McDougall’s Glace Bay office where 
Assistant General Manager F.W. Gray gave the letter to Andrew Merkel to send out on 
the Canadian Press wire. The letter was published in two Nova Scotia newspapers, the 
Sydney Post and the Halifax Chronicle, on 5 July and the result was the arrest of 
Livingstone and McLachlan on 6 July. They were taken to Halifax and charged with 
publishing false statements. Harrington was hired immediately as McLachlan’s lawyer 
for the trial scheduled for 15 October, 1923 in Halifax. David Frank has noted that 
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Harrington’s junior counsel, J.A. Walker, fought successfully in Halifax for bail despite 




Concurrently, on 7 July, Prime Minister Mackenzie King sent a detailed telegram 
to Armstrong who by then was Premier of Nova Scotia, stating that E.M. Macdonald, 
Acting Minister of National Defence, had cabled him that troops were not necessary in 
Nova Scotia. The Prime Minister said the federal cabinet unanimously agreed that 
Armstrong should advise Finlayson and Thacker that the situation in Nova Scotia was 
causing problems in other areas of the country and ask them the advisability of 
Armstrong making a public statement that no further troops were required and those there 
would be withdrawn.” King went on “I hope your government will do all in its power to 
cooperate with our Government in avoiding this critical situation.”
67
 Armstrong was 
unmoved by the Prime Minister’s request. 
 The UMW International President, John L. Lewis, ordered the District 26 
executive to obey its contract and not call for the miners to go out in sympathy with the 
steelworkers. McLachlan claimed (and according to Forsey he still believed in 1926) that: 
“While we work you [the coal company] will pay that wage rate. While you pay that rate 
we may work or we may not work. You have the right to throw us idle. We have the right 
to stay home.” McLachlan said the contract was deliberately crafted so there would be no 
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breach of contract in going on strike.
68
 When District 26’s executive defied Lewis’s order 
to return to work, Lewis responded by suspending the district charter on 17 July, ousting 
the "Red" executive, including Livingstone and McLachlan, and placing Silby Barrett in 
charge of managing the district. He also declared that neither Livingstone nor McLachlan 
could run for re-election. Forsey, who worked with Barrett later at the Canadian Congress 
of Labor (CLC), claimed Barrett was a man of his word who saw to it that union and 
employer both adhered to any contract they signed.
69
Harrington applied for an injunction 
against the order, claiming that under the District’s autonomy clause, Lewis had no right 
to fire members of the executive.
70
The injunction was denied. The local’s charter was 
revoked and Silby Barrett’s appointment as head of the provisional administration was 
confirmed. 
At the time the Governor General, Lord Byng of Vimy, was en route to Pictou for 
celebrations honoring the 150 years since the ship Hector had arrived in Pictou Harbour 
with a contingent of Scottish settlers. In an unusual and unexplained series of events, 
Independent Senator John Anthony McDonald – an Amherst and Halifax business figure 
appointed to the Senate by the former Conservative Prime Minister Arthur Meighen – 
contacted E. M. Macdonald, Acting Minister of Defence at his home in Pictou to tell 
Macdonald that, at Amherst, he had approached the Governor General and forwarded a 
request that Byng meet with McLachlan, Livingstone and with Glace Bay mayor and 
MLA, D. W. Morrison. Byng agreed to the meeting. There is no indication where this 
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request originated. It led to a series of telegrams and messages among E.M. Macdonald, 
the Prime Minister, Morrison and representative of the Department of Labour prior to the 
proposed meeting.
71
 Afterward, King needed assurances that Byng had not, as outlined in 
a telegram from Mayor Morrison to King, overstepped his constitutional authority by 
promising either the removal of troops or a Royal Commission. E.M. Macdonald also 
advised the Prime Minister that the Governor General knew that McLachlan and 
Livingstone had been deposed from the UMW and had no formal authority to speak for 
the miners and steelworkers.
72
 
 From Sydney, Byng forwarded to King petitions presented by representatives of 
the miners and also a detailed letter from future District 26 President John W. MacLeod 
outlining living and working conditions in nearby Dominion No. 6. Byng told King that 
he was impressed by MacLeod and the letter, which he forwarded to King along with the 
petitions.
73
Byng was taken aback by the poor housing and lack of amenities provided for 
the steel workers. He wrote: “Whilst visiting the steel works, I could not help noticing 
that so little was done for the employees in way of provision of recreation rooms, 
grounds, clubs, compensation in the case of accidents, pensions, etc.” He said the miners 
returned to work feeling defeated and that this spirit might well bring them out on strike 
again. “But,” Byng continued, “if the troops were removed and an investigation held into 
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the grievances of the steel workers by an independent body of experts, it would produce a 
feeling that the men’s case had been seriously considered.”
74
 
King thanked Byng for his comments and added: 
… in my own opinion, the British Empire Steel Corporation is very far 
behind the times in its labour policies if indeed the Corporation has any 
worthy the name. The condition of chronic unrest there has been for years 
past is sufficient evidence. No work is harder or more unpleasant and 
agree [sic], that too great consideration cannot be shown in those matters 




 King told Byng that one of the difficulties facing the federal government was the 
province’s desire to keep Ottawa out of the situation except to send troops.  
On 10 August King wrote Nova Scotia Premier Armstrong to say that an 
investigation into the situation in the coal fields was imperative and asked whether 
Armstrong thought the provincial or federal government should take charge of the 
inquiry.
76
 Armstrong replied that the province would “cooperate in any proper and 
legitimate way with the federal government,” but he believed that normal conditions were 
being gradually and permanently restored, that agitators had been dealt with, that Besco 
was being maligned and there was really no need for an inquiry.
77
 This was the second 
time that Armstrong had refused a direct and detailed request from the Prime Minister. 
This, and Armstrong’s insistence on calling troops into the area against King's wishes, 
might have limited federal government assistance to the provincial Liberals in the Nova 
Scotia provincial election in 1925. 
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On 7 September, 1923, in preparing for the McLachlan trial, Harrington filed an 
affidavit in which he stated that he was hired as counsel for McLachlan since his arrest 
for alleged offence against Section 236 of the Canadian Criminal Code. “The said J.B. 
McLachlan at present stands committed for trial in the City of Halifax, for the said 
alleged offence of publishing false tales of the activities of the Provincial Police of the 
Province of Nova Scotia, at Sydney of or about Sunday the 1
st
 of July, A.D. 1923.” 
78
 
Harrington  went on to state that “the defence would have to examine up to 18 witnesses 
all of whom are resident in or around the City of Sydney…the locality in which the said 
activities occurred.” Harrington, arguing for a change of venue, wrote that the defendant 
advised that he could not afford to transport witnesses to Halifax. (McLachlan had been 
deposed from his position with the UMW and the Nova Scotia Workers’ Defence 
Committee that was paying for his defence apparently had not raised enough money to 
pay for witnesses to go to Halifax.)
79
 Further, Harrington wrote, a jury would need to be 
familiar with the premises, (that area in Sydney in which the alleged offence occurred), 
since the location could not be easily explained.  
Frank noted that on 24 September, J.A. Walker – a Halifax lawyer and assistant to 
Harrington – filed a change of venue request in Halifax, arguing that the trial should take 
place in the location where the alleged offence took place. It is unclear whether this was a 
new request or whether it was the same as one that Harrington had filed earlier in the 
month. Attorney General O’Hearn appeared in court personally to argue that a jury in 
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Sydney would be too sympathetic to the defendant.
80
 This claim must have been made 
prior to 7 September, at which time Harrington stated in an affidavit:  
I was counsel for accused persons charged with offences growing out of 
the strike at the coal mines in Cape Breton County in the year 1909, when 
many of such said accused persons were convicted of the said offences 
charged, by petit juries drawn in the Court of Cape Breton and containing 




O’Hearn also argued that the case should be heard in Halifax because the letter 
was published in a Halifax paper. Harrington stated both in his 7 September affidavit and 
again in court:  
During the month of July, A.D., 1923, after the arrest of said Defendant, I 
was present in the City of Halifax for a period of over two weeks and, 
during that tiem [sic], discussed the matters involved in this charge with a 
number of persons of the class from which juries are customarily drawn, 
and I found such persons strongly prejudiced against the accused, because 
of inaccurate and unfair newspaper articles and reports, which had 
appeared in the City of Halifax regarding the events in question and 
regarding the said accused.
82 
 
In 1923 the justice system allowed considerable leeway to the judge and the 
prosecution. There was no necessity for the prosecution to disclose information to the 
defence. It was quite legal to change the charge in court, and there was no impediment to 
the judge showing open bias. But even then, Harrington, on behalf of the defence, and 
having called no witnesses, should have spoken last to the jury. For reasons unrecorded, 
the usual process was overturned and O’Hearn had the last word.
83
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The two-day trial began with a change to the charges, from publishing false 
statements to seditious libel, a much more serious charge that could bring a sentence of 
20 years. The libel outlined in the original charge, which would consider the relative truth 
of the statements and for which the defence was prepared, was not heard. Under the new 
charge, only those related to sedition were to be considered. Harrington’s objections to 
the form and content of the charges were ignored, as was his argument that the sudden 
change in the charges left the defence unprepared. Harrington argued that the charges 
were unsustainable and lacked specificity but his objections were overruled by Judge 
Humphrey Mellish.
84 
Although McLachlan had been removed from his position with the UMW 
between the time of indictment and the trial, apparently material sent from the 
prosecution to him at his former address went astray. The prosecution again had material 
to which Harrington had no access, once more putting the defence at a disadvantage.
85
 
The Crown introduced witnesses giving the province’s view of the events at the 
Sydney Steel Plant on 1 July 1923. Over Harrington’s objections that the events were 
unrelated to the new charge, Judge Mellish, a former Chief Counsel for the coal 
company, deemed the information necessary background, but the defence was refused the 
opportunity to present contrary evidence on the same event such as an article in a Sydney 
newspaper alleging abuse of citizens by the provincial police.
86
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From that point it was clear the case was lost.
87
 Yet Harrington struggled to 
counter the prosecution’s case. Under his cross-examination, witnesses called by the 
prosecution had their comments questioned or at least modified, although to a jury 
unfamiliar with the context it is unlikely the corrections registered.
88
 Harrington 
questioned the editor of the Halifax Chronicle about publishing the letter with the 
headline, “Miners Duped by False Statements.” He challenged the editor, James Hickey, 
to point out the false statements in the letter.
89
 The editor admitted he was unable to do so 
because he had no idea of the truth or falsehood of the material but he did write the 
headline nevertheless. When Harrington asked the court why his client was on trial while 
Gray (who had the letter published in the newspapers) and Hickey (who published “false 
statements” in his headline) were not, Mellish retorted that those men were not on trial. 
McLachlan was.
90 
The prosecution introduced communist literature recovered illegally from 
McLachlan’s house in the spring as part of a search for Communist Party organizer and 
speaker Malcolm Bruce. A delegate to the June convention of District 26 in Truro said 
that it was likely McLachlan who had written a policy aimed at “the complete overthrow 
of the capitalistic system and the capitalist State, peacefully if we may, forcefully if we 
must.”
91
 The policy had been withdrawn by International President John L. Lewis, but the 
jury did hear of McLachlan’s support for the communist cause. Truly significant was 
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Mellish’s address to the jury.
92
 In seven pages of direction, he reminded the jury of 
McLachlan’s communist views and, with regard to the material removed illegally from 
his house, said it did not matter whether the material was gathered legally or illegally, nor 
whether the statements in his letter were true. The jury was to consider McLachlan’s 
intention. Mellish said he questioned (but told the jury not to take his opinion) why 
labouring men, if they wanted wrongs addressed by lawful means, would want the 
removal of the police and the military. He claimed that the question of the actions of the 
provincial police: 
in doing what they did is not directly before you and I don’t think it has 
very much bearing on this case….they restored order…whether they 
trampled this one or that one under, whether they broke anyone’s hand or 
whether they exceeded the reasonable demands of the situation in dealing 
with the crowd there at that time is not, I think, a matter of very much 
import.  
 
The jury found McLachlan guilty on 31 October 1923 and he was sentenced to 
two years in Dorchester Penitentiary. Following the conviction, the defence filed an 
appeal listing 11 errors in law that occurred during the trial.
93
 Frank noted that the judges 
who denied the appeal did set aside the conviction on the charges related to the article 




On 10 January 1924, Mellish responded to a request from the Solicitor General of 
Canada to supply the indictment, the transcript of the trial and his address to the jury.
95
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Mellish’s letter noted that he had been more lenient than he would have liked given that 
the laws had recently been changed to allow for a 20-year sentence.  Harrington applied 
for leave to petition the Privy Council. Provincial Supreme Court Justices Russell and 
Chisholm agreed and Chief Justice Harris claimed he reluctantly went along, signing the 
petition on 15 February 1924. Justice Chisholm wrote that the use of written material 
found in a suspected person’s library might be considered “a question of great general 
and public importance.”
96
 On 27 February 1924 Governor General Byng signed a “ticket 
of leave” for McLachlan, essentially probation that allowed him to serve the rest of his 
sentence in his home town but subject to the usual restrictions including reporting 
monthly to an officer of the court.
97 
The Sydney Record, despite being a Liberal newspaper, printed a report from the 
Canadian Press in which Harrington argued that to call McLachlan a communist was to 
label all those miners who continually voted for him and invoked the argument for 
freedom of speech. The paper quoted Harrington’s rhetorical question about why, when 
others published McLachlan’s letter to local unions, they were not in the dock along with 
McLachlan.
98
 The Sydney Record quoted the Attorney General as saying that murder 
trials on the docket were not as important as McLachlan’s, because for years he had heard 
people criticize the police and that he was determined when he had the chance he would 
lock horns with them. O’Hearn said that he held no brief with Hickey or Gray but if they 
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were charged he would convict them, a comment reflecting O’Hearn’s unusual sense of 
justice. 
99 
In November, Harrington was back in Cape Breton successfully defending 
“Moscow Jack” MacDonald on the charge of sedition. The Maritime Labor Herald on 3 
November reported; 
G.S Harrington gave a fine address to the jury. He stressed the point that 
one of the witnesses for prosecution had admitted to taking several drinks 
of liquor before attending the meeting and it was therefore possible that he 
might have been mistaken about the words used by the speaker. He 
ridiculed the idea that it was a crime to criticize the government of the 
country. He pointed out that the members of the cabinets of Canada had 
toured the country denouncing the previous governments. He claimed that 
the evidence presented by the defence proved that the words charged had 




From 1921 to 1924, it seems Harrington’s negotiating and legal skills proved 
valuable to the UMW. Temperamentally he would have sided with the moderate wing of 
the union yet he did not shirk his duty to the radical executive when it was elected. No 
doubt the trial of J.B. McLachlan would have been frustrating and disappointing, but it 
did little to damage Harrington’s reputation. Despite McLachlan’s conviction, it was 
generally recognized that the result of the trial was a foregone conclusion. Further 
deterioration in relations between the union and Besco would see Harrington drawn 
further into the activities of the UMW in 1924 and 1925, but in the meantime the 
evidence indicates that during the already-stormy earlier years he had fully undertaken 
the role of dutiful counsel to the union.  









Chapter 5  
Prelude to Provincial Politics 
 
On 6 October 1923 the Maritime Labor Herald reported that Phalen Local of the 
UMW in New Aberdeen was requesting other locals’ support to have the Provisional 
Executive ask the company to end its contract with the union in January, 1924 and to 
request a 40 per cent raise under a new contract.
1
 The Financial Post reported that 
Phalen’s request for a 40 per cent increase was designed to embarrass Silby Barrett, head 
of the provisional executive, who had come to be thought of as a “satellite of 
[International President John L.] Lewis,” whom they believed to have abandoned them in 
their struggles in 1922.
2
 
At that time, the Provisional Executive had asked for a wage increase of about 20 
per cent. The Corporation gave notice of a 20 to 25 per cent reduction, whereupon both 
sides agreed to draft the contract of working conditions and procedure first, going on to 
the wage scale afterwards. The Corporation whittled down the proposed decrease to 10 
per cent with further details including a return to summer and winter rates and offered to 
guarantee four days per week at Sydney Mines and five at Glace Bay. The contract was 
to run until January, 1925. The men insisted on an increase and walked out on 15 January 
1924. Roy Wolvin eventually capitulated to a 6.32 per cent increase, on condition that the 
union would accept as part of the contract, a rigid clause on the subject of maintenance 
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men staying on the job during strikes and that the union would also agree to stop the 
locals from providing financial support to the Maritime Labor Herald.3 
C.B. Wade wrote that the financial aspect of the agreement was a good one 
considering the falling markets and growing unemployment in the country. The Royal 
Commission Respecting the Coal Mines of the Province of Nova Scotia, 1925, known as 
the Duncan Commission of 1925, later reported, “We find the reduction of wages in 1922 
was not justified at that date; a reduction would have been justified at some date in 1923; 
further that the wage increase given in 1924 was unwarranted”.
4
 Despite the miners’ 
disappointment with the contract, coal production increased, according to the Glace Bay 
Gazette: 
The output at the collieries this week (1April 1924) has shown marked 
increase and the output for the month is likely to be a record one. On 
Tuesday and Wednesday the collieries produced over 14,000 tons and it is 
expected that this figure will be reached today. When No. 1B begins to 




In September, 1924, a reinstated District 26 elected a new slate of officers. J.W. 
McLeod from Dominion No. 6 was elected president, defeating Robert Baxter. Joe 
Nearing became vice president and Alex MacKay was elected secretary treasurer. In an 
easier time, with a more responsible management, life would have become more settled 
with the election of McLeod. His stated goal was to heal the rifts within the union. He 
had a strong sense that Besco was corrupt but, unlike McLachlan, felt that those who 
wanted to nationalize the mines did not know what would be involved in such an 
adventure. McLeod operated from middle ground. He told the Duncan Commission: 
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I first joined the United Mine Workers of America in Dominion No.6 
when it was considered a crime by church and state to do so and when 
preachers used to get up in their pulpits and wave the British flag; accuse 
us of unpatriotism and all that sort of stuff. And I know what I am talking 




Agnes Macphail, Member of Parliament for Southeast Grey in Ontario, met 
McLeod on a visit to Glace Bay in early 1925. She reported that he was an “exceedingly 
sane man,” thought by some to be too moderate. She concluded that the government, the 
company or “anybody else concerned in the affair, ought to be glad to encourage the 
continuance of a union under the leadership of Mr. McLeod.”
7
 Sir Andrew Rae Duncan 
told Andrew Merkel that there was no finer labour leader in England.
8
 
McLeod’s collegial relationship with Harrington was criticized by “Moscow 
Jack” MacDonald , who claimed the union executive now went to Harrington for advice 
instead of McLachlan. His view has been summarized by David Frank: 
MacLeod had never been a member of the [Communist] party but instead 
of relying on the advice of veterans of the labour wars such as McLachlan, 
McLeod had virtually abdicated leadership of the union to the district’s 
legal advisor Gordon Harrington: “The officers went to him for advice. He 
attends their board meetings, drafts all statements and had the officers sign 
same”. Harrington was “undoubtedly playing the Conservative game” and 




Despite the change to the UMW executive and the preceding 14 months that  the 
union had been under Barrett’s moderate leadership, Besco continued to blame the union 
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for its poor results. The Canadian Annual Review reported on the company’s 
performance during that time in early 1925:  
[Besco’s] operations…were considerably reduced in 1924 over 1923. The 
company’s official statement dated 16 May 1925, gave aggregate days 
during which 14 coal mines…were in operation in 1923 as 3,085, 
compared with an aggregate of 2,713 for 15 mines in 1924. Production in 
1923 was 3,342,152 tons and 2,979,039 tons in 1924. Days worked 
averaged 187 days in 1924 as against 220 in 1923 and average output in 




Normally, it would seem that a company whose fortunes were fading might, 
especially with the election of a moderate union executive, try to develop a collaborative 
relationship with its employees. But in December of 1924, Besco Vice President J.E. 
McLurg, who had succeeded D.H. McDougall, presented a proposal for a 10 per cent cut 
across the board to run from16 January 1925 to 30 November 1926. It was a “take it or 
leave it,” one-day only-offer.
11
 For various reasons, the union failed to respond and the 
offer became void. Besco applied for and got a conciliation board. It had two members 
whose companies did regular business with Besco. The union registered its objection. 
Nevertheless the board came to Cape Breton. McLeod made a brief appearance to 
announce that the UMW would not participate. The union had the sympathy of the 
Federal Minister of Labour, who admitted that past investigations into conditions in the 
coalfields had never been as thorough as they should have been.
12
 
The refusal of the company to cooperate in good faith with the UMW was 
hardening the union’s position. The union sent an eleven-page brief to the conciliation 
board outlining its position:  
                                                   
10
 Canadian Annual Review, 1924-25, 351. 
11
 Forsey, National Problems, 63-64. 
12





We do not doubt the sincerity or honesty of purpose of any such Board 
and we mean no discourtesy to it, but we have been through this 
experience frequently and the procedure is familiar to us…and eventually 
we will be confronted with the Batons of the Provincial Police and the 
Bayonets of the Canadian Militia as the final reason for us to accept a cut, 
when we ask no more than human treatment for our workers and their 
women and children. Many children cannot attend school owing to lack of 
food and clothing and whole families face starvation at the present 
moment…Yet whoever criticizes this corporation is termed “Red” and 




An article in the Winnipeg Tribune stated that before miners who had worked 
only half time for more than a year were asked to accept lower wages, the financial and 
commercial conditions of the company ought to be laid bare to the last decimal point, 
“…and that it be held strictly to account for the method and manner of that operation.” 
The article went on to say: 
no industry has been treated so well in Canada as the steel industry and 
Besco has no reason not to be profitable given that there is nowhere else 
on the American continent or in Europe that the mines are right beside the 




Between 20 and 23 February 1925, Premier Armstrong, seemingly ignorant of 
Besco’s reputation with businesses, newspapers, other governments and unions, 
conferred with both Besco and the UMW. He then recommended a Royal Commission to 
investigate Besco’s ability to pay, the results of which would bind both parties. The 
company agreed, but the union saw no advantage in approving something in advance 
given its past experience.
15
As well, the union suspected, and the Duncan Commission 
later confirmed, that Besco was using profits in the coal industry to sustain other 
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branches of its operations, so the financial picture it presented was not specific to the coal 
mines.
16
 At the same time International President Lewis wrote to Ottawa, stating that in 
December the most militant collieries, No. 2, No.4 and No.6, worked only eight days, 
seven in January and four in February. Lewis complained it was obvious Besco was 
deliberately punishing the miners in these areas by working those mines on short time.
17
 
With more than1500 people dependent on short time, McLeod told the Duncan 
Commission that the union believed it had a verbal agreement with the company from 
December 1924 that these people would be given credit at the company stores for bare 
necessities of life. On March 2 the company closed the company stores in New Aberdeen 
(No.2), Caledonia (No.4) and Dominion No.6. 
18
 
We cannot conceive of such a total absence of administrative ability as 
would allow you to pursue this course and expect results other than 
tumults and disorder. Lacking courage to produce those unfortunate results 
by attempting a cut in wage rates, you have taken the circuitous, but 
equally effective, method of producing them by starvation. If you have 
authority and desire personally to save the situation, we sincerely 
recommend to you the following steps: (a) Forthwith reestablish credit in 
your stores.,. (b) …immediate orders for commencing work at collieries 
2,4, and 6 for a minimum of four days a week You must realize that, in 
view of your treatment of us as we have outlined above it is an easy matter 
for us to declare your conduct a lockout of our members, which means a 




McLurg reiterated his earlier statement that the company decided it was 
inadvisable to extend further credit at the stores and that lack of demand for coal made it 
impossible to work collieries 2, 4 and 6 for the proposed four days per week.
20
 Eugene 
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Forsey was one informed observer who found it odd that McLurg claimed he did not 
expect any reaction to the closing of the company stores. The reporter Andrew Merkel 
asked McLurg if he was playing a game of poker, to which McLurg replied that the 
company held all the cards and in a statement that would come back to haunt the 
company, he added that the miners “could not stand the gaff.”
21
 
The strike began on 6 March 1925 and was followed by another series of fruitless 
meetings between the union and the company. 
 International President Lewis left one meeting claiming that Wolvin was out to 
smash the union, and after a private meeting with Premier Armstrong and Wolvin, 
McLeod left with the comment that Wolvin had been tactless and truculent.
22
 Armstrong 
begged Wolvin to reverse the decision to close the company stores.  Wolvin replied that 
there were some miners determined “to wreck the industries.” Although the company had 
tens of thousands of tons of coal stockpiled in No. 2 yard, he maintained that: 
a reduction in daily wage rate would assure greater production of coal, 
larger outlets, increased employment and larger annual income to the 
miner, under present conditions and the refusal of the men’s leaders to 





New Aberdeen, Caledonia and Dominion No.6, the most militant collieries with 
the fewest shifts, were also the areas of poorest housing and sanitation. New Aberdeen 
consistently had high child mortality rates due to poor sanitation. In 1925, Sarah Gold, a 
social worker from Halifax, wrote an extensive article in the magazine Social Welfare 
giving a chilling portrayal of the size and conditions of company housing, its inhabitants 
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 There is no doubt that families in these areas were deeply in debt to 
the company stores, but they were caught in a Catch 22. Without work, there was no 
money to shop anywhere else and without work they could not pay their bills at the 
company store. Without credit at the company store, there was no food, no clothing and 
little chance of children going to school. And, although there was understandable 
sympathy for the miners, it was Agnes Macphail who declared that the life of a woman in 
Glace Bay was “a tragedy.”
25
 William Duff, Liberal MP from Lunenburg, continued to 
hold the Nova Scotia Government’s party line that all was fine in Glace Bay, except for 
trouble caused by a few communists. He complained that Macphail had been led astray 
by “being in bad company” in Glace Bay when she was with the mayor of the town, 
D.W. Morrison.
26
 Meanwhile, Conservative and CCF members questioned Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King vigorously in the House of Commons, but King said his hands 
were tied until he had a request for help from the government of Nova Scotia. The 
opposition leader, Arthur Meighen, asked why Canadians could send help to foreign 
countries but not to needy Canadians.
27
 
On 3 March 1925, one day after the closing of the company stores, federal 
Conservative Leader, Sir Arthur Meighen, wrote Harrington asking how the issue of the 
Maritime Rights Movement was playing in his area. Meighen said that he had put a 
motion on the order papers with respect to the Movement and was disappointed when the 
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delegation from Nova Scotia had watered down their request.
28
 Harrington responded 
that, “Unfortunately we have been so disturbed in this community of late, that I have not 
followed closely the developments regarding your resolution and the divergence from it 
made by the recent delegation to Ottawa.”
29
 
He went on to say “In this district the movement can be confined practically to two items 
(1) freight rates and (2) protection on steel and coal.” 
Concessions in freight rates for shipments to and from the Province of 
Nova Scotia are desirable to allow of cheaper rail transport of Coal and 
Steel from Cape Breton to rail markets, and conversely it should 
encourage shipments from maritime ports, thereby tending to build up 
those communities that provide those commodities…the lack of high 
tariffs has led to the dumping of cheap American coal and “the effort to 
meet this in competitive prices has caused continuously depreciating 
standard of living of our Cape Breton miners.”  
 
 Concerning Besco, Harrington states that any corporation whose product is 
protected by tariff should be made subject to governmental control. “The provincial 
government and Besco are asking for increased duties and rail subventions at the same 
time that the Corporation announces that they will not reduce consumer prices in Canada 
and will cut wages to its employees.” Harrington noted that Besco does not appear to be 
possessed of ordinary business instincts but nevertheless “when tariff protection is given 
to the commodities produced by a corporation, the government, in a measure, must 
assume responsibility for the manner in which that corporation, in a general way, 
conducts its business and especially towards its employees.”
30
 
All in all, for Harrington: 
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until some very severe restrictions are placed upon it in the handling of the 
monopoly it has in my opinion, it would be unwise to protect the 
industries operated by this corporation, industries based on the natural 
resources of our country. The absurdity of this corporation asking for tariff 
concessions on the one hand, and reduction in already too meager wage 
scales on the other hand must be apparent …Further the corporation 
appears to be hopelessly unsound and its direction is beyond comment. 
We have practical starvation amongst us here at the present moment, 





Meighen was apparently not entirely convinced, replying, “I quite realize the 
feeling is very general in Nova Scotia as respects the British Empire Steel Corporation 
and the reaction of this feeling on the protection issue. Still the company can be reformed 
and a policy is either right or wrong irrespective of the character of a single concern.”
32
 
Meighen was stating Conservative Party policy with respect to protection of domestic 
industry, which had been in effect since the 1870s. Harrington, nominally a Conservative, 
disagreed with the Party’s policy when it came to Besco and his response to Meighen 
showed how strongly he believed in his point of view.  
CCF parliamentarians James Irvine (Calgary), Agnes Macphail, and J.S. 
Woodsworth (Winnipeg), visited Glace Bay at this time, and in Parliament they engaged 
Liberals from Nova Scotia in a debate about conditions there. Generally, Liberal 
members remained neutral or supported the Nova Scotia government’s stance, although 
one member, William Carroll, from Richmond County, said that the Corporation had to 
pay its men a living wage, and once the men had that, it was incumbent upon them to 
work diligently.
33
 The impending devastation from the closing of the company stores and 
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the lack of work, meanwhile, was foreseen by community leaders in Glace Bay such as 
Rev. A.A. McAvoy, minister at the Glace Bay Baptist Church, who organized the Glace 
Bay Central Relief Committee. The Committee, in religion-conscious Glace Bay, 
included a Catholic priest, a Protestant minister and leaders of the Salvation Army along 
with the wife of a prominent Jewish merchant, as well as the mayor’s wife, the former 
mayor’s wife and several volunteers. It operated out of the YMCA in Glace Bay, and 
organized relief stations in many communities, demonstrating that the need went beyond 
No.2, No.4 and No.6.
34
 
McAvoy was interviewed by the Toronto Daily Star in April 1925. He reported 
on a meeting with a Parliamentary Committee in which William Duff (Liberal MP for 
Lunenburg, Nova Scotia) continued to claim that all was well in Glace Bay except for a 
few communists. McAvoy responded the men were not communists but people looking 
for a decent standard of living. He said they were as loyal as any other Canadians, having 
4000 returned veterans among them, and also noted that the single men were leaving at a 
rate of some 200 per week to find work elsewhere.
35
 
The individual and organizational response to conditions in Glace Bay was 
overwhelming. Various sources note the numbers and variety of assistance that poured 
into the town. The Great War Veterans’ Association drew large funds from across the 
country. The Quaker Oats Company sent a trainload of oats and CN Rail offered its 
services to transport goods. The Salvation Army opened two depots in Toronto to collect 
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 The Canadian Trades and Labor Council not only assisted 
materially but encouraged the International UMW to increase a$5000 donation to 
$10,000 per week.
37
  The Toronto Daily Star sent Group of Seven painter Lawren Harris 
to Glace Bay to write articles for the paper. Harris was also inspired to paint his famous 
Glace Bay Miners’ Houses, currently hanging in the Art Gallery of Ontario.  
The Star ran articles almost daily and, along with other newspapers including the 
Halifax Herald, set up relief funds to help the community. Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King made a private donation,
38
 but the Province of Nova Scotia was not so helpful. 
Finally pushed to action, it donated money to the Red Cross. On 8 April, McAvoy told 
the Sydney Post that donations were slowing because it was thought by donors that the 
province had stepped in. In fact, the Armstrong Government had allocated funds to the 
Red Cross, which was directed to use the money only on the “sick and infirm” and not for 
relief. McAvoy said that on that day alone the Relief Committee had cared for 1926 
families comprising 10,090 people, and he questioned whether the Committee could 
carry on without further contributions.
39
 
The impasse between the union and the company continued and frustration 
escalated. On 11 June, a violent confrontation occurred between company police and 
miners at the New Waterford power plant. One miner, William Davis, was shot and killed 
and several men on both sides were seriously injured. Troops were once again called into 
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the area but not before some buildings, including company stores, were looted and 
burned. 
Just weeks before these events, on 27 May, Harrington and Joseph MacDonald 
had been nominated to run for the Conservative Party in the upcoming provincial 
election, following the usual practice of one Catholic and one Protestant on the ticket. 
The Conservative Sydney Post commented on the unusually large number of labour 
representatives at the nomination meeting.
40
 Harrington and MacDonald were running in 
the new constituency of Cape Breton Centre. The Liberal government, understanding it 
had lost the miners’ vote, gerrymandered Cape Breton constituencies, corralling almost 
all the mining communities into Cape Breton East where J.C. Douglas and Alex 
O’Handley were running.
41
 In his acceptance speech Harrington said he preferred to live 
his life in seclusion, but there were times when duty overrode personal convictions. He 
said he was running to try to obtain a “Canadian standard of living” for miners. His 
objectives were to have ministers of education and health, to establish a department of 
labour and to see the community benefit from the work of the miners.
42
 
Once again, Harrington claimed to want peace and seclusion while stepping into a 
hornet’s nest of disunity and intrigue. This time it was the Nova Scotia Conservative 
Party. By 1922 the provincial Conservative Party had almost completely collapsed, after 
more than thirty years of continuous Liberal government. Some efforts were made to 
initiate a revival, and a new leader, William Hall of Queens County, was elected in June 
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 Hall began to campaign in rural Nova Scotia to revive interest in the party, but 
funds were in short supply.
44
 By 1925, moreover, W.H. Dennis, publisher of the 
Conservative Halifax Herald, was complaining to Arthur Meighen that there were 
conspirators within the party trying to destroy Hall’s work and his reputation. Dennis 
claimed that Party President Frank Stanfield was sitting on thousands of dollars that 
should be used to help Hall in his single-handed efforts to raise the prospects of the 
Conservative party.
45
 In a series of subsequent letters, Dennis urged Meighen to pressure 
E.N. Rhodes to come to Nova Scotia to lead the party into the 1925 election.
46
 
Rhodes, a graduate of Acadia University and a lawyer, had been elected to the 
House of Commons to represent Cumberland County in 1908, 1911 and in 1917. He was 
appointed Deputy Speaker of the House in 1916 and Speaker in 1917. He was re-
appointed under the Liberal government in 1918 and had not lived in Nova Scotia for 
some time. His father and his maternal uncle, Nathanial Curry, had owned the Amherst-
based Rhodes Curry Company, which among other business ventures had built several 
thousand company houses in Glace Bay and area in 1901. In Amherst, the company’s rail 
car business had been the largest employer in the town, although its merger in 1909 with 
two Montreal concerns to form the Canadian Car and Foundry Company had led to a 
scaling down of the Amherst Operations.
47
 On 19 February 1925, Meighen responded to 
Dennis’s request that he encourage Rhodes to lead the Nova Scotia Conservative Party 
into the next election by saying he had discussed the possibility with Rhodes, who had 
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made conditions that Meighen was not at liberty to divulge.
48
 On 28 March, Dennis wrote 
to Meighen: 
Through intrigue on the part of men who should have been supporting and 
assisting Hall and strengthening his hand in every possible way, 
conditions in Nova Scotia are in a state of chaos. Hall is about 
disheartened. Two or three prominent men – it is not necessary to mention 
names – who are not friends of yours, have carried a most insidious 
campaign against Hall among Conservative people throughout the 
Province, with the sole object of so thoroughly discrediting him that the 
Conservative Party would get down on their knees and pick the leader of 
the group to take over the leadership. You have no conception of the 




On 1 April, Meighen wrote to Dennis that Rhodes was “personally averse to 
taking on the responsibility,” but he thought Rhodes might be convinced that the esteem 
in which he was held might be lessened should he refuse.
50
 It appears that this argument 
worked. Stanfield and Dennis were convinced that Hall could not win the upcoming 
provincial election and convinced him to resign, which he did on 12 May. Claiming there 
was insufficient time for a convention, the party executive and nominated candidates met 
on 21 May, and chose Rhodes to lead the Conservatives into the July election.
51
 
The Conservative party won an overwhelming majority in the provincial election 
of 1925, leaving the Liberals with only three seats. The assumption that the provincial 
government supported Besco against the miners distressed many voters . This and the 
issue of Maritime Rights was enough to ensure the government’s defeat.
52
 Voters in 
many areas of the province were infuriated with Besco’s treatment of the miners and their 
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families. Armstrong was seen to be timid in not wanting to take sides in the strike but, in 
fact he had done so when he not only refused to go to Glace Bay but made the 
unfortunate comment that the poverty in Glace Bay was exaggerated.
53
 When cabinet 
minister A.S. MacMillan went to Glace Bay, he said that he had seen poverty but it was 
mainly among “shiftless” people who had put nothing aside for a rainy day.
54
 By 1925, 
continuing disagreements with Mackenzie King over labour troubles led the federal 
government to wash its hands of the Nova Scotia coal industry and it refused to 
accommodate Armstrong’s request for commission to investigate the coal industry, thus 
diminishing federal support in the election the provincial Liberals needed.
55
 The 
gerrymandering that pulled nearly all the miners in one constituency fooled no one. The 
Liberal government then changed course and went so far as to accuse Harrington of 
deliberately prolonging the strike.
56
 They then accused the Conservatives of being 
communists and Bolsheviks, an argument that must have amused Rhodes.
57
 More 
interesting is what appears to have been the successful collaboration between the 
Orthodox Conservative, Rhodes and the “Red Tory,” Harrington who was sworn in as 
Minister of Public Works and Mines. 
                                                   
53
 Forbes, “Rise and Fall of the Conservative Party,” 47. 
54
 Ibid., 48. 
55
 Beck, Politics of Nova Scotia, 103. 
56
 Forbes, “Rise and Fall of the Conservative Party,” 53. The letter from Harrington, legal counsel for 
District 26, to its president, speculated that if the men refused a rollback in wages, it would lead to Wolvin 
being replaced by someone more favourable to labour. Forbes surmises this was simply a suggestion for 
negotiating strategy. Harrington ran in a constituency with few miners’ votes and won an overwhelming 
majority. 
57
 In 1914, the Nova Scotia Liberal Government pushed through a bill privatizing the Halifax Tramways 
Corporation. The interests behind the venture included Nathan Curry and E. N. Rhodes. The consortium 
soon sold the business to American interests for considerable profit. Many prominent Conservatives fought 
the legislation. See Christopher Armstrong and H. V. Nelles, “Getting Your Way in Nova Scotia: 





 An editorial in the Ottawa Citizen urged Rhodes to make a quick settlement of the 
miners’ strike, pointing out that not only were the mines in danger, but women and 
children had been “barely existing for months for want of food.” It went on to say that the 
outcome of the election showed that the electors of Nova Scotia, and people outside the 
province had confidence in the Rhodes government. “There is no such evidence of 
confidence in Roy S. Wolvin or James B. McLachlan. The blind stubbornness or reckless 
hostility of extremists on either side cannot be allowed to strike shattering blows at the 




Rhodes, as Premier, has been given credit for settling the miners’ strike in Cape 
Breton at least temporarily. Rhodes arrived in Nova Scotia sometime in May of 1925, just 
weeks before the election. Harrington, except for his time with the OMFC, had lived and 
worked with the miners. There was also no doubt Besco knew where Harrington stood, 
but perhaps expected Rhodes to bend more in its direction. If that was the case, Wolvin 
and company did themselves no favours by lecturing the new premier on what he must do 
in formulating his approach to his stated goal of settling the strike. Among Besco’s 
recommendations were what wage rates he must advise the miners to accept. In an article 
in the company’s in-house newsletter, Wolvin told Rhodes it was his duty to determine 
how the “Red” element could be exterminated and how to get it done. As well, Rhodes 
“must consider very carefully” if he should have any communication with officials of the 
United Mine Workers of America. The article suggested that Rhodes must be aware of 
past failures due to “the determined and unreasoning opposition of the spokesmen for the 
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miners to any proposal made to them for settlement,” presumably this included the 
Minister of Mines, who just weeks earlier had been counsel for the UMW.
59
 
It would appear that Wolvin, McLurg and Besco executives were so far out of 
touch with public opinion that they saw no difficulty in actually printing this directive to 
the new government, as well as their reaction to the outcome of Rhodes’ and 
Harrington’s negotiations. The interim decision by Rhodes and Harrington was designed 
to get the men back to work quickly, and would run for six months pending a full inquiry 
into the coal industry in Nova Scotia.
60
 The terms of the contract would be those of the 
1924 contract with the wage scale to be that of the 1922 contract estimated to have been 
between six and eight per cent below the scale of 1924. Regular employees were to be 
hired before outside labour was engaged. The government was to rebate 1/5
th
 of its 
royalties for 12 months, and the government agreed to conduct a binding referendum on 
the check-off. All other contentious issues were to be directed to the Royal Commission 
investigation that would soon convene under the leadership of Sir Andrew Rae Duncan.
61
 
Wolvin’s reaction to the government’s release of its plan to end the strike, to the 
company and the union at the same time, seemed to be one of incredulity. His letter, 
published in the Besco Bulletin recognized that the decision of the government “must be 
given due consideration.” He noted however, “We find that this proposal having been 
given to the union becomes a barrier to any effort of this Corporation to effect a better 
arrangement direct with its employees.” He urged Rhodes to reconsider “this drastic 
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 Rhodes replied that the decision did not preclude any further or other 
agreements between the Corporation and the men but was intended to get the mines 




Frank wrote that the miners’ experience with Besco led to a permanent distrust by 
Cape Bretoners of outside capitalists.
64
 The distrust was far more pervasive. Harrington 
was well aware of a deep-seated distrust when he wrote his friend Col. L. M. S. Amery, 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies asking him to recommend “a chairman of 
outstanding merit” to come from Britain to head a Royal Commission on Nova Scotia's 
coal industry. Harrington suggested that if Amery were to give him the information 
quietly, a formal request would be sent from the Province's Lieutenant Governor. In the 
letter, Harrington explained that there had been great difficulty in the industry for the 
previous five years. “There has been pronounced dissatisfaction with the Corporation that 
controls the [coal] production in the Province, and latterly a spirit of mutual distrust 




In fact, the Duncan Commission of 1925 found several layers of distrust existing 
between the company and the miners as well as within the company and within the union. 
The company had a history of spying on the union and it put undue emphasis on the 
communist activity within the union. But the commissioners found that within the union, 
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trade union activity and industrial negotiations “were being confused or overridden by the 
political and social theories and aims of avowed communists working within the 
Union.”
66
 The commissioners found the men nursed petty grievances rather than consult 
the union, which it felt was preoccupied with more general issues.
67
 
There was no doubt Besco used the fear of communism to gain support for its 
treatment of the UMW and its leaders. During the Royal Commission hearings, Wolvin 
and other representatives of the company continually brought up the large part which 
communists had played in the troubles of the previous four years. McCann told the 
Commission there were about 1200 communists, but in conversation with Forsey he said 
500, while the communists themselves told Forsey they had barely 100 followers. Forsey 
does say that there was no doubt their influence was out of proportion to their numbers.
68
 
The Commission condemned the Maritime Labor Herald’s “press propaganda being 
actively conducted in certain mining communities with the object of making well-ordered 
and amicable relationships within the existing order of industry impossible.”
69
 
On the other side, the Corporation refused to give local management the authority 
to “settle claims and complaints on their merit.”
70
 
The Duncan Commission of 1925 reported that in 1922, events changed within a 
few months such that the demands made by the company were greater than they might 
have been. This led to a belief by the men that the company’s demands had been 
“unnecessary and insincere.” Feelings became so embittered that they destroyed 
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confidence in the reliability of figures supplied by the operators in subsequent dealings. 
The men believed that if the figures related to coal production were separated out from 
other constituents of the Corporation, the figures would be more favourable. In other 
words, the men felt they were “being called upon, without their consent, and without 




These circumstances in part explain the hopelessness which seems to have 
characterised both sides throughout the last few years that they could not 
reach common ground. They seem never to have got into such a serious 
discussion as to make it necessary for either side to understand the other’s 
point of view. There cannot be good will and sympathetic understanding 
between the parties if they rest content to talk at each other through public 




Concurrent with the establishment of the Maritime Labor Herald by the original 
founders, was the organization of the Workers Education Club at the UMW offices where 
one of the rooms had been set aside for a library. Lectures were planned on a broad range 




 On 14 October 1922, the Maritime Labor Herald reported that Gordon S. 
Harrington was the first speaker at the first regularly scheduled Friday night lectures 
sponsored by the Workers’ Education Club.
74
 In Harrington’s lecture, which the paper 
took pains to report was “not in the least dogmatic,” he said that current institutions were 
developed by man to meet his needs as he evolved from the cave to a modern existence 
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and, in answer to the communists who wanted to destroy traditional economic structures, 
he said that even if those institutions were to be criticized and required improvement, 
they should still be respected for the roles they played. 
 Harrington asked why it was that in a province made up mostly of workers, that 
the majority of those elected to the Legislature were lawyers and other professionals. He 
said he believed that in order for government to represent the working man, the working 
man needed to elect men educated in History, Economics, English and other subjects to 
help him best understand and represent his constituents. He suggested that District 26 
make a ten-year agreement with universities to waive tuition for three students each year 
from the union to take these and other courses. Under this proposal the union would 
provide money for living costs and the students would be required, when not at 
university, to return to work and to educate their fellow workers both on the job and in 
evening courses.
75
 This possibility was not pursued, but it does reflect Harrington’s belief 
in the power of education that first brought him to Glace Bay. 
 Harrington argued that a broad education would lead people to develop their own 
informed opinions; to understand economics, history and politics to see both sides of a 
situation, and appreciate other points of view. He believed that a general education would 
also add light to the everyday living and working experiences of miners and their 
families. Education would address the sense of helplessness resulting from being buffeted 
by the various factions vying for the miners’ support.
76
 









Prior to the official opening of the club, Dr. Clarence MacKinnon and local 
businessman Stuart McCawley met with members to discuss the possibility of a trade 
school in Glace Bay. The coal company had an agreement with the provincial and federal 
governments whereby the company would pay future students five days’ pay to attend the 
trade school for three days each week. The project failed. First the Province backed out of 
the agreement and the Federal Government followed. MacKinnon and McCawley asked 
the group if they should approach the Carnegie Foundation, which was funding education 
projects in the province. The idea was turned down because distrust prevailed when it 
was considered there might be strings attached.
77
 
Nine months later, on 12 July 1923, Andrew Merkel of the Canadian Press, who 
put J. B. McLachlan’s letter on the wire service, wrote an extensive article on conditions 
in the coalfields of Cape Breton that was shared with all Canadian Press’ subscribers. He 
admitted that having read other newspaper reports, he arrived with a prejudice against the 
miners but soon reversed his position.
78
 
Merkel said he was struck by the vehemence with which the miners believed that 
everybody was against them including newspapers, the international president of their 
union, and the provincial and federal governments. The deep underlying reason for this 
state of mind, according to Merkel was “the persistent reporting of false tales in 
newspapers.”
79
 He gave as examples reports that the coal pile at Dominion Number 2 was 
in imminent danger of destruction. It was not. It was reported, erroneously, that the mines 
were rapidly filling with water. He said that five thousand miners heard their leaders 











speak, then, the next day they found that words had been put into the mouths of those 
leaders which they know were never uttered.  
With distrust running so deep, it made sense that the people of industrial Cape 
Breton voted for Harrington in the 1925 election. In 1922, it was Harrington the miners 
wanted to represent them when successive industrial commissions failed to understand 
their plight. And it was Harrington the Liberal Government hired to end the strike that 
saw the military removed from the town. In 1923, it was the moderate Harrington who 
was hired to defend communists in court, and in 1924, it was Harrington who worked 
with MacLeod and the moderate wing of the UMW to try to reach an honourable peace in 
the coalfields.  
In office, Harrington, as Minister of Mines and Public Works, devoted most of his 
energy to the mines portfolio. Merkel wrote that, even after Harrington became Premier 
in 1930, it took months to move him from the ministry office to the more prestigious 
Premier’s office.
80
 In a response to congratulations on his election win in 1925 from 
General Currie, Harrington wrote, “After my experience wrecking myself in the Overseas 
Ministry you will no doubt agree that it was supreme stupidity for me to undertake 
anything of this character, and unless I can get from under some of the pressure it will 
probably mean a collapse such as Rhodes has had recently.”
81
Apparently health problems 
did recur. In 1927 Harrington wrote Rhodes from New York on his way south. In the note 
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he said that after the trip, if he still needed time to rest, he would do it in Nova Scotia.
82
 
And in 1928 while Harrington was recovering at his camp from an undisclosed illness, 
Rhodes wrote that he should take the full month to recover and that he, Rhodes, was 




Harrington may have been recovering his health but his thoughts were not far 
from his portfolio. In May he wrote to Rhodes detailing his concerns about the leadership 
in Nova Scotia’s coal and steel industry. As long as McLurg and McCann were involved, 
he believed, there would be friction and the “entire situation may boil up at any time.” He 
wrote that they and others, whom he named, knew nothing about running the industry and 
the men knew it. He added that F.W. Gray also had the contempt of the miners due to his 
years of support for Wolvin who had resigned in January 1928.
84
 He argued for a change 
in leadership, on the ground that “I feel that the present contract which calls for the 
cooperation of the men may be jeopardized by retention of these old officials,” and 
perhaps referring back to negotiations in 1925 he continued, “and you know how I feel 
towards attempting again to smooth out difficulties.”
85
 
C. B. Wade wrote in his unpublished History of District 26 that he was unable to 
discover why the Conservatives were so anxious to get rid of Wolvin. In all likelihood, 
however, Harrington, during his ongoing involvement with District 26, would have 
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become very frustrated with attempts to negotiate with Besco and particularly Roy 
Wolvin. Harrington had successfully negotiated the terms by which Canada gained 
control of its own troops from Britain in the First World War, through hard work he 
earned the role of Deputy Minister of Canadian Forces and he negotiated the final 
financial settlement with the British War Office. Yet subsequently he found himself 
being stonewalled by the intransigent head of Besco, who had neither knowledge of the 
industry he led nor concern for the lives of his employees.  
Andrew Merkel wrote that the traits he admired most about Harrington were his 
sincerity, his inflexible will and his modesty.
86
 No doubt it was his sincerity and 
inflexible will that guided his determination to see improvement in the miners’ living and 
working conditions. The only way to do that in 1925 was to step into the political fray. 
There can be little doubt that Harrington ran for election on the Conservative ticket on the 
understanding that he would get the mines portfolio. L.D. Currie, from Glace Bay, a 
future Liberal cabinet minister said that Harrington had “neither the political record nor 
local party support to match [John C.] Douglas.”
87
 Douglas represented the Conservatives 
in Cape Breton East, the constituency that contained most of the mining communities. 
Douglas also had a long association with the UMW, was a stalwart of the party and a 
long-time supporter of Rhodes. But the post was given to Harrington. No doubt this 
“outsider” getting such an important portfolio must have rankled some traditional 
Conservatives but that would have been only part of the internal turmoil boiling within 
the party as it took over from the forty year-old Liberal government. 
                                                   
86
 Merkel, Halifax Mail, 5 March 1947. 
87





In his interview with Beverley Owen for Maclean’s Magazine in 1931, 
Harrington, even after being elected and re-elected as a Conservative, claimed he was a 
Conservative by birth only and had no deep philosophical bond with any particular party. 
This attitude and opinion no doubt dismayed many in the party and Harrington said he 
bore as much criticism from within the party as from without. He said there were those 
on the outside who criticized him, claiming he was a “died-in-the-wool Tory opportunist 
who pretended to be a socialist to gain the miners’ trust and then betrayed them to win 
the election.” Owen pointed out that Harrington had won elections in 1925 and 1928 with 




Forbes wrote that Harrington had taken over the post of Minister of Public Works 
and Mines at a time when the relations of labour and management, embittered after a long 
period of strikes and violence, were probably at their worst in the history of mining in 
Nova Scotia: 
Within a period of five years…the strike had ended, the mines had been  
reorganized under new management, and the mining continued without reports of  
strikes or even serious disputes between labour and management, in the process,  
Harrington…. maintained the largest personal majorities at elections of any  




It appears likely that in his role of legal counsel for the UMW District 26, 
Harrington expected that he would work behind the scenes, but from 1922 when the 
miners asked that he represent them in negotiations and when he negotiated a settlement 
at a time when, according to the Duncan Commission of 1925, relations between the 
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company and men were at their lowest ebb, the course appears to have been set for his 
eventual entry into politics. Certainly, having had several successful negotiations with the 
British War Office, he probably would have found that being stonewalled by the 
intransigent President of Besco in efforts to effect a reasonable settlement between the 
union and the company left him little choice.  
Harrington, the “Red Tory,” introduced many socially progressive measures both 
as Minister of Mines and Public Works and as Premier including a minimum wage for 
women, improved access to education and a Department of Labour. His attempts to 
introduce an old age pension failed to materialize. In 1933, although Harrington was re-
elected, the Conservatives lost the election due to a combination of the Depression, 
patronage issues, internal squabbling and an attractive new leader of the opposition 
Liberals. 
The effect of the “Franchise Scandal” in the Conservative loss is difficult to 
assess. Staff in the Conservative Party office designed a plan to disenfranchise thousands 
of citizens and noting that the Liberals made great use of it in its propaganda, Beck points 
to an article in the Herald showing that some 40,000 more citizens had been registered 
compared to 1928.
90
 Forbes wrote that the scandal turned the Conservative loss into a 
“rout.”
91
 Beck is less emphatic on the issue but agrees that the vote might have been 
closer without the scandal.
92
 Harrington was again suffering poor health but there is no 
indication if, or how, this might have contributed to the loss. Harrington wanted to resign 
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but his dedication to duty saw him encouraged to stay on as leader of the opposition until 







 Spheres of Usefulness 
In his ongoing search for peace and seclusion, Gordon Sidney Harrington made no 
attempt to be popular, nor did he aspire to a life in politics. In 1934, after Harrington had 
won his seat in three consecutive elections, Sydney MP, Finlay MacDonald, observed 
that Harrington had no “particular gifts as a politician.”
1
 In 1925, Harrington personally 
told that consummate politician, Sir Robert Borden, that he found politics distasteful. 
Certainly that comment reflected the sincerity that Canadian Press superintendent 
Andrew Merkel admired in Harrington. Merkel said he was also impressed with 
Harrington’s inflexible will and his modesty. He confirmed that Harrington was not a 
glad-handing politician, and said that he would eventually pay the price for not playing 
the political game. However, it was likely these very characteristics that led people to put 
their trust in him. This was very significant in a community where trust was a rare 
commodity.
2
 It seems rather unusual that a young lawyer from upper class Halifax would 
set up an office in the booming mining town of Glace Bay and within seven years, in 
1913, become so in tune with the town and its people that he would be elected mayor. 
This was all the more surprising given that a few short years earlier, in 1909, the town 
had been fractured by a violent dispute between two unions that caused hardship, 
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poverty, family rifts and military intervention. Harrington, it must be remembered, 
worked for the losing side.  
Then, in a town highly segregated by religion, he, an Anglican, married a Roman 
Catholic just sixteen months before his election. Future mayor D.W. Morrison served on 
council when Harrington was mayor and said that the town made significant progress 
while Harrington held that post. At the time, one of the major impediments to progress 
was negotiating which parts of the town were the property, and responsibility, of the coal 
company and which fell to the mayor and town council. Despite the tradition in Glace 
Bay to alternate Protestant and Catholic candidates for mayor at the completion of a term, 
Morrison said that, had Harrington stayed in town in 1915, he would have been re-
elected. Instead, Harrington inspired young men from Glace Bay and surrounding areas 
to join the 185
th
 Cape Breton Highlanders “B” Company. He trained them and 
accompanied them overseas in October, 1916, believing promises that men from the same 
units would fight together. The British ignored these promises as battalions were broken 
up to fill vacancies in the British forces. It is difficult to imagine how this betrayal would 
have affected Harrington who knew these men personally, had encouraged them to enlist 
and no doubt voiced the promise that they would fight together. It is also impossible to 
speculate how the break-up of the battalions by British commanders would affect his 
determination in future negotiations with the British War office. 
When Harrington was promoted to the OMFC in April, 1917, he had progressed 
through various training and administrative positions and had seen action at the Front, a 
condition of employment at the OMFC at that time. Sir George Perley, Canadian High 





consulted Militia Minister Sir Edward Kemp, who recommended some young 
Conservative officers from Toronto whom Perley rejected. Yet, when Kemp himself 
became Minister of the Office of the Ministry of the Forces of Canada, according to 
Morton, he took his time searching the ranks for that officer who would best fill the post.
3
 
Kemp divided his time between London and Canada, trusting the young Harrington, first 
as Acting Deputy Minister and then Deputy Minister, with onerous responsibilities. 
Harrington was also a major figure, and in fact may have been instrumental, in the 
negotiations that took the management of Canadian Forces away from the British and put 
under Canadian control. Re-establishing the broken trust in the OMFC by Canadian 
Forces in the field was a major priority. Among those whose trust was required was 
General Arthur Currie, with whom Harrington developed a personal friendship.  
Harrington did not fully recover his health following his bout with the Spanish 
Influenza near the end of the war. General Currie wrote that anyone who was overseas in 
the First World War would have reduced immunity to illness, and, in addition as Kemp 
wrote to Borden, Harrington’s workload further weakened his health. Certainly the 
frustration of making ongoing arrangements to get the Canadians back home after the war 
would further test his well-being. 
So it was with broken health that Harrington returned to Canada in 1919, to 
Ottawa, a place he detested, but where he was needed. When Kemp’s doctor refused to 
allow him to travel to Britain to negotiate the final financial settlement with the British, it 
was Harrington who was entrusted to take his place. Harrington’s dedication to duty saw 
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him stay until every detail was complete even though he was anxious to get home to 
Nova Scotia. 
Despite his questionable physical health, there can be no doubt about the strength 
of Harrington’s personality or his negotiating skills. Striving for peace and quiet after the 
war, instead of accepting business or political positions likely offered to him, he chose to 
go to Sydney, the small steel city not far from Glace Bay, where he had begun his career. 
Harrington said he had originally moved to Glace Bay to practice law but also to engage 
in his avocation of studying economics and sociology. For this, Glace Bay was fertile 
ground given the influx of new cultures and a new form of existence that saw miners and 
their families crowded into rows of small, poorly-built houses with little space between 
them and without running water or sewers. Large sections of the town were ready-made 
for disease, rampant early childhood deaths, and poor educational prospects. Harrington 
and his fellow veterans found that after years of loss and deprivation overseas those who 
returned faced a town where little had improved. In fact the post-war depression and the 
lack of markets for steel meant fewer shifts in the mines and at the steel plant, 
deteriorating housing and increased illness. 
If there was pervasive sentiment in the coal mining communities in the early 
1920s it was distrust. On 12 July, 1923, Andrew Merkel of the Canadian Press wrote 
from industrial Cape Breton that his most striking impression on arriving there was of the 
vehemence with which the miners believed that everybody was against them. Not only 







 As Harrington himself would put it some two years later, “There 
has been pronounced dissatisfaction with the Corporation that controls the [coal] 
production in the Province, and latterly a spirit of mutual distrust between this employer 
and its employees has made satisfactory operation of the coal areas impracticable.”
5
 The 
Report of the Royal Commission Respecting the Coal Mining Industry in the Province of 
Nova Scotia, commonly known as the Duncan Commission of 1925, confirmed this 
position and went further, saying it had found levels of distrust within the coal company 
and within the union as well.
6
 Yet Harrington, despite the reservations of the more radical 
among UMW leaders, proved able to generate trust and confidence first as legal counsel 
to the UMW and subsequently as an elected official. His subsequent political life would 
have mixed success. He served as Premier for some three years and although he was re-
elected in 1933, his government experienced defeat. Along with continuing health issues, 
his early years – both in Cape Breton before and after the First World War, and in the war 
itself – formed the essential preparation and background for the evolution of his political 
career. 
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